The air situation as depicted by Sameer Joshi showing radar and ELINT data fused together to identify PAF aircraft operating on 27 February 2019
Air Marshal (R) Harish Masand feels that this is Not Really a Doctrinal Issue
In an interview with Shekhar Gupta sometime back, it was heartening to observe the last air chief, Air Chief Marshal BS ‘Tony’ Dhanoa, stating that (if) “we had shot down four or five of their (meaning Pakistani) aircraft, the behavioural change would have taken place immediately”. This interview was published in February, 2020 ‘Pak’s version a story, a façade’. What was heartening to note was that the Air Force had obviously revisited the entire operation of the strike on the terrorist camp at Balakot on 26 February 2019 and subsequent engagement with the PAF the very next morning when the PAF launched their Operation Swift Retort in retaliation to the Balakot strike and so draw appropriate lessons from these for the future. Without going into any controversies around the Balakot strike itself, it is undeniable that both these operations were the first of their kind nearly four decades after the 1971 Indo-Pak war, in terms of the IAF having crossed into Pakistani territory with an air-to-air engagement the next morning. It was immediately evident that the IAF had lost an opportunity in the aerial engagement of 27 February 2019 so as to assert its strength and send a clear message to the PAF on ‘domination’ of South Asian skies, the claims of an F-16 for the loss of a MiG-21 notwithstanding. Such a revisit and the lessons drawn have been timely considering that within a few months of this admission from the former Air Chief, the IAF was to be deployed in strength in Ladakh to counter Chinese aggression. Now, after some ten months of such Chinese intrusion, the IAF remains very much on full alert all along the borders, from the North to the East and may well have to prove to the nation that it has truly drawn the right lessons from operations of the past. The IAF must assure the nation that the trust reposed on it, as the first responder to security threats to the nation, is not misplaced. Considering the current grave situation along our borders and the threat of a two-front conflict, it is imperative to examine some of the obvious lessons of the past once more without going into tactics and based purely on public domain information available.
Designing the battle-space
The art of war is to design the battle-space – and the battle – in such a manner that the enemy is lured to fight the way we want, where we can impose our superior strategy, technology, training and tactics to defeat him. In that respect, while Balakot 2019 was the perfect way to evoke a response from the Pakistan Air Force, by all accounts we did not capitalise on the opportunity offered to inflict major losses on it which would have been a very sobering lesson, at least for a few years to come. Having successfully hit Balakot on 26 February 2019, having crossed the Rubicon so to speak, it must be assumed that national security agencies, including all arms of the armed forces were ready for retaliation from Pakistan whenever and wherever that may have come. There should have been no doubt in anyone’s mind that retaliation at a time and place choosing of Pakistan’s was certain, particularly when the Pakistani PM himself, had immediately come on TV and so stated, leaving it open in terms of type, place and timing. Culturally, as well as politically, it would have been impossible for Pakistan not to retaliate in some way or another. That the retaliation came the very next morning, and in the form most likely through the Pakistan Air Force considering the escalatory ladder, should really have been to our advantage. Thus, taking alert status of the Indian Air Force as a given, the question which comes readily to mind was whether the IAF had foreseen the likely intrusion in force by the PAF resulting in an engagement and had trained itself for the desired end-state? If, as the Air Chief in charge of everything at that time now implies, the message would have gone strongly and the desired behavioral change in Pakistan come about immediately with a large number of Pakistani aircraft having been shot down, one wonders as to what prevented the IAF from achieving such an objective on that fateful morning? Such a statement tends to confirm that this was not a doctrinal deficiency, which then leaves open questions on perhaps some shortcomings in our equipment, execution or training? Having lured the PAF, why did the IAF not respond to the Pakistani challenge of 27 February 2019 in greater numbers so as to ambush and overwhelm the intruders, shoot down most of them, if not all, as has been stated earlier? Certainly the IAF had the assets and capability to achieve that objective, particularly when viewed in the context of the statements from Air Chief Marshal Dhanoa that, despite its less than the full strength desired, the IAF had a ‘Plan B’ and the ability to fight a two-front war as demonstrated in Exercise Gagan Shakti of April 2018 which reportedly generated about 11,000 sorties in a limited time period. At that time, the CAS had also claimed that “both our adversaries had monitored this exercise and must have drawn appropriate lessons from it”. Considering all this, it thus seems somewhat strange that against a Pakistani force of 24-26 aircraft, the IAF launched a meagre force of four or six MiG-21Bisons to supplement two Su-30s and two Mirage 2000 aircraft that already were on combat air patrol. This becomes even more baffling when viewed in context of the statements that the BVR missiles carried by the Pakistani F-16s had a range superior to those missiles in our inventory at that time. However, this issue of the range of BVRmissiles with the opponents and its effect on the engagement is actually in the realm of tactics and need not be discussed here except to state that an engagement based purely on comparative ranges of BVR missiles, reflects poorly on the execution and training of a professional Service. The female officer, who was controller on the ground that time, later came on TV and stated that she “saw the (radar) scope filling up with blips all over and scrambled the MiG-21bisons which were on standby, apart from controlling the Su-30s/Mirages already in the air” or words to that effect. Without taking anything away from reaction of the controller that morning, and the subsequent award she received for her actions, the question which comes up then is as to why she did not order the launch of more aircraft from different air bases and thus position a larger number from different directions to confront the Pakistani fighter package? It is difficult to believe that the IAF did not have more aircraft on readiness for such a contingency, a considerable number surely being on high alert after having conducted the Balakot strike just the day before. Also, if she did not order the launch of more aircraft to overwhelm the enemy, what were the actions of the sector director and others higher up in command who should have been monitoring the air situation, even in New Delhi with the Integrated Air Command & Control System (IACCS) in place, particularly when we have been touting our emphasis on net-centric warfare now for over a decade?
Dissimilar formation of IAF aircraft: MiG-27ML, Jaguar, MiG-21bison (photo: Simon Watson)
Doctrine of the IAF
Doctrine of the IAF very rightly – and clearly – emphasises the importance of air superiority and the various methods for achieving this. Therefore, any doctrinal deficiency can be ruled out. The next link in the chain is emphasis on the doctrine and the strategies employed to implement the chosen manner to achieve air superiority in varied situations. Emerging from such doctrinal emphasis would be identifying the assets required and the equipment on board to achieve the objective in such engagements. Once again, was it a lacuna in the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) or the orders on such situations or was this some lack of visualisation and training for situations such as this? Whichever way one looks at it, this certainly was a lost opportunity, as the former CAS had rued almost a year after the event. Particularly strange is that the scrambled MiG-21bisons (from Srinagar) apparently did not carry the ECM pod that day and, perhaps, this is one of reasons for subsequently losing Abhinandan’s MiG-21? A capable EW/ECM system is absolutely essential for any aircraft operating in the modern battlefield and even more so for a fighter aircraft in an aerial engagement in today’s environment. Sending an aircraft into combat without an EW system is like sending a lamb to the slaughterhouse. Visualising such an obvious environment in the future, as Director Aircraft Upgrade in charge of the MiG-21Bis upgrade programme at the time, I am personally aware that we had purchased adequate numbers of ECM pods for the Bison fleet in 1996 to equip almost every aircraft being prepared for such missions. Therefore, to keep an aircraft in readiness for a possible engagement without a functioning ECM and then to launch it into battle, also raises some questions on the concept of employment and tactics for engagements. We were fortunate that despite the overwhelming numerical superiority that the PAF enjoyed on 27 February 2019, apart from their claims of fully integrated net-worked fighters with superior BVR missiles and years of training, the PAF did not press home their numerical advantage and inflict even larger losses on the IAF than just that single MiG-21bison flown by Abhinandan. It’s almost certain that, despite all the claims being made by PAF’s Gp Capt Kaiser Tufail, particularly on the number of aircraft that he indirectly implies were shot down that day, by clubbing Swift Retort with counter insurgency and their experience during the Afghan War, the PAF is perhaps also ruing their lost opportunities!
IAF Mirage 2000 at night ORP (Photo: Angad Singh)
The Sukhoi Su-30MKI now equips some 12 squadrons of the IAF (Photo: Simon Watson)
In this interview with Shekhar Gupta referred to earlier, the ex-CAS also stated “If we had….” referring to the planned induction of Rafales and S-400 SAMs, thus linking availability of such systems to any success of operations for air superiority or air dominance, as some have started terming the objective. Unfortunately, such a statement tends to deflect and divert the analysis and the lessons thereof, from what could or should have been done with available resources as against what may have been if we had “better assets”. Mere induction of superior technology does not always result in success: it is actually how one uses such technology in conformity with the doctrine and formulated strategy alongside rigorous training for such operations. Just because the new Meteor missile has a larger claimed range, and a no-escape zone, compared with BVRs of the Pakistan Air Force, does not mean that the Rafale would always win against an F-16 carrying the AIM-120 AMRAAM or that the PAF would avoid combat, particularly against the Rafales. As a matter of fact, I am of the opinion that the PAF would definitely attempt to seek combat with the Rafales as and when the next aerial engagement takes place perhaps with some different tactics in an effort to down one or more of these and so boast about this to the entire world! This is what they seem to have attempted against the Su-30s in 2019 and, while they did not succeed in shooting down these, they certainly claimed a Su-30 along with that MiG-21bison.
IAF fighter pilots of a MiG-29UPG squadron (Photo: Phil Camp)
IAF MiG-21bison on full afterburner (photo by Simon Watson)
Is BVR Combat, be all, end all?
BVR combat is essentially a combination of electronics and manoeuvres combined with numbers and positioning in an integrated manner through secure data links in a net-centric environment. This writer had earlier also argued that BVR missile ranges were not the sole criterion in an aerial engagement. If the maximum range of BVR missiles was the main criterion, the emphasis of future developments in this area, following the Phoenix missile on the F-14 Tomcat in the 1970s with its 160 km range, would have been on longer range missiles with a higher kill probability and not on combat platforms with greater agility for close combat, which are designed at great effort, complexity and expense. Instead, at enormous cost, today’s fighter aircraft designs emphasise stealth, super-cruise as well as super-maneuverability, the last only essential if final combat within visual ranges is envisaged. At the same time, efforts have been to develop smaller shorter-range BVR missiles so that a larger number can be carried in the weapon bays of stealth aircraft. BVR combat is certainly the initial phase in today’s air combat but it is hard to believe that this is the end all and after exchange of BVR missiles at long ranges, both opponents would retire to fight another day, again with just BVR missiles. One may also take note of the number of AMRAAMs fired on that fateful morning, all of which missed, with no losses except perhaps in the case of Abhinandan’s MiG-21. At this rate, we could expect both sides to very quickly expend such missiles considering the limited number that Air Force’s can afford to maintain in the inventory because of their high costs, limited shelf life and utilisation. With all that said, one does need to take note in the article by the retired Air Commodore Kaiser Tufail of the PAF, and his views on the impact of Rafales in the skies of South Asia. Tufail claims that the upcoming PL-15 BVR missile carried by the PAF’s JF-17 fighters, in combination with their new AESA radar, would actually beat the Meteor missile on the Rafale by “tens of kilometres”. Apart from the PL-15 missile that he mentions, the US has already noted challenges of the improved PL-21 missile from China. Surely, the US is not just trying to build longer range air-to-air missiles to achieve air superiority. The IAF, thus, needs to consider how it wishes to fight the next such engagement for air superiority even with the Rafale, keeping in mind Tufail’s comparison of the full net-centric integration of fighters on both sides. Against the PLAAF, the IAF also needs to factor in the stealth factor sooner than later. Unfortunately, the article by Tufail also unnecessarily mocks PM Modi’s statement on the lines of Dhanoa’s “if we had”. Ignoring the sarcasm, one does need to take note of Tufail’s reference on “cost effectiveness’” of four JF-17s against the price of one Rafale, although he does not elaborate on the importance of numbers in air combat. As they say, quantity has a quality of its own. Therefore, considering its depleted strength and the challenges of two to three fronts, the third being the maritime one as well as budgetary constraints, the Indian Air Force seriously needs to think of more cost-effective options for fighters in much larger numbers, as recommended earlier in an article on the depleted strength of the IAF in Vayu Aerospace Review. By the way, Tufail’s article admits that the PAF used F-16s with AMRAAMs while referring to the skirmish during Op Swift Retort on 27 February, 2019, something that the IAF has been saying all the while with recovered pieces of the AMRAAM. Going along the same lines, someday we may also get details of the PAF aircraft and pilot lost on 27 February, 2019. Was that an F-16 or a JF-17 and was it lost to Abhinandan’s MiG-21bison or because of fratricide, just as the IAF downed its own Mi-17 helicopter in the fog of war that morning? Another problem with statements of “if we had” is that even if we had the assets being mentioned, would they have been in such numbers to have been available in the concerned sector/place in time? With regard to the S-400 next generation surface to air missile system, it has been reported that the IAF is acquiring five units of this system at a cost of US$ 5.43 billion in addition to the NASAM, at some US$ 1.86 billion.
As per this report, one of the S-400s is for the National Capital Region leaving the four others for rest of the extended western, northern and eastern borders. Considering the likely threats in the current scenario with China and Pakistan, even with the maximum reported range of 400 km at high altitudes for the S-400, five units of these would not nearly be enough to cover India’s vulnerable areas thus leaving gaps which could be exploited by adversaries. Even though the systems are mobile, they move at surface speeds and cannot be shuffled about everywhere to immediately react to emerging airborne threats. All such defensive systems are also susceptible to concerted attacks and while resistant to jamming, it would be too optimistic to expect that a determined adversary would not find appropriate counter-measures against the S-400. In this context, one recollects the 1973 Yom Kippur war and, more importantly air actions over the Bekaa valley in 1982, when the Israeli Air Force reportedly took out 19 Syrian SAM sites in two hours without losing an aircraft and then 82 Syrian fighters in less than two days without loss. These 19 missile systems were deployed in the Bekaa valley within a total length of approximately 120 km placing each missile site around 6 km from each other and offering much overlap and mutual support. The problem with SAM systems is their relative immobility, which makes them vulnerable against a determined enemy while also restricting one’s own air operations. The fratricide experienced by the Egyptians in the 1973 Yom Kippur War and also the IAF on 27 February, 2019 may also be considered in this context. More importantly, excessive reliance on SAMs tends to tie one down in a defensive strategy (and mindset) as air defence is best performed by fighters in an offensive defensive strategy. The overall high cost of trying to secure every vital area or point with SAMs also devours resources that may be more cost-effectively employed in flexible fighter aircraft supported by appropriate combat support systems. All this comes down to the choice on how one wishes to fight the next air war or even a short and swift engagement like the one on 27 February 2019 with meticulous planning, equipping and training for the likely scenario. In this connection, it may be of interest to note that most armed forces, being conservative in their approach and outlook particularly in peacetime, tend to fight the last war. Many examples of this tendency can be given. Some can even be found in the way the battles of 1965 and 1971 wars were fought. This is true even of the PAF. The Israeli approach in Bekaa valley was an exception and obviously derived from the lessons learnt in the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Bekaa valley was thus a precursor to the first Gulf War.
Indian Air Force Rafale over Hindan at Air Force Day Parade (Photo by Angad Singh)
PAF JF-17 armed with combination of air-to-air-missiles (Photo from internet)
However, in that Gulf War the US and its allies fought against a poorly equipped enemy with a huge technological asymmetry in their favor. Against a more equal opponent, the lessons from that war cannot truly be directly applied or replicated blindly without major modifications to the approach. It is also widely known that the PLAAF seems to have been heavily influenced by the first Gulf War. That should give us a clue on how they are going to try and fight if push comes to shove in the current standoff in Eastern Ladakh and elsewhere on the northern front.
Most cost effective options Certainly, the IAF is seriously working on all these scenarios and debating the most cost effective options to overcome deficiencies in its quest for air dominance in South Asian skies. This article would now attempt to highlight some of the essential steps that the IAF leadership may surely be considering. As stated earlier, the first and most obvious step is to define exactly how the IAF wishes to fight the next battle for air dominance. In this context, it is felt that an all out conventional war seems most unlikely in today’s geo-political scenario under a nuclear overhang though we have to be prepared for it should a low intensity conflict continue for a relatively longer period, particularly in terms of equipment and stockpiling of spares and munitions. In any event, such a conflict would be preceded by some sharp engagements in the preliminary confrontation period, the Galwan encounter of 15 June, 2020 being an example, while the aggressor attempts to build up a case in the international community for the planned aggression. The very first aerial engagement would be the opportunity to show our real worth and capabilities. Unlike skirmishes on land, the psychological impact of the first major engagement in the air is manifold, far more than the actual losses and the comparative strengths of the opponents particularly since the engagement is over in minutes if not seconds. Having spent many years in this domain, I feel certain that the expertise of TACDE in devising appropriate strategies and tactics – as well as that of COBRA on such scenarios – have already been utilised in this effort. As a matter of fact, outlines of future air battles were submitted to Air HQ, as a classified paper, as early as mid-1994 while an article on the impact of AWACS on future air wars was published by Sqn Ldr Ajay Singh in 1995.
J-10s of the PLAAF (Photo from internet)
Unfortunately, although I read this article at that time, I have not been able to find a link or citation to it after all these years. Certainly, the authorities concerned must well have considered all of these while devising appropriate strategy and tactics to suit the current scenario and advances in technology. The above exercise must certainly have examined deficiencies in certain assets and equipment which may include the need for more combat support systems as well as secure data links and communication sets on certain platforms as also current needs of EW suites. While the deficiencies in data links and communications could be rapidly made up, EW systems require a vast amount of data, painstakingly gathered over time through every possible means of intelligence gathering. Based on such high quality intelligence, EW suites may have to be developed or updated indigenously because of the classified nature of such data/information on systems to be countered and the requisite technology to effectively counter them. Such intelligence and technology is unlikely to be made available by foreign sources. Fortunately, some of our existing establishments, like DARE and ADE, have requisite expertise in this field and may be able to develop appropriate systems and software, particularly if we second specially selected IAF engineers and operators on such programmes.
Concurrently, the IAF must disseminate formulated tactics to all operators who will participate in such missions and then train them hard for it. Quite obviously, the amount of effort required for training such a large number of personnel involved in air dominance operations, which would include large-force engagements, could be prohibitive in terms of the available assets, their life and utilisation rates. There is also the problem of mounting requisite air effort regularly in a secure area outside the monitoring zones of our adversaries. Air Combat Simulation Fortunately, most training for BVR engagements can be more economically, realistically and effectively be conducted now via appropriate simulators, with multiple modules, with the added advantage of pause and replay in between when the actions of one or more members need to be reviewed. Once again, however, such simulators require programming with classified information and parameters, not realistically available from foreign sources, apart from their much higher costs when done by foreign vendors. In this area too, indigenous agencies are available to put together the required simulator sets for various types of aircraft envisaged to be used in such engagements – provided we define the exact requirements and associate our own people with the development! Many of our retired officers had, when in service, made great strides in simulation and software development and the IAF could explore the possibility of engaging them for development of such simulators on a proprietary and confidential basis with some initial developmental funding, if required. Such an approach would be more cost-effective in the longterm when compared with the known costs of large international simulator companies – apart from the aspect of classified information.
Pair of IAF Mirage 2000s (photo: IAF)
Further, a number of such simulator sets would have to be built so as to place these at various locations to cover regular training of all operators. This would enable huge savings on the actual flying effort that would otherwise be required to keep all operators current on the latest systems and tactics. Such simulators could also be easily adapted to conduct other aspects of training, including air-to-surface missions, particularly in employment of standoff weapons. Additionally, such simulation automatically contributes in eliminating accidents in such engagements, particularly for operators being initiated in such exercises with a large number of aircraft, thus significantly adding to the savings. For the longer term, the IAF needs to define the kind of equipment it needs for the likely missions it would be required to undertake. Such definition should shape its re-equipment and modernisation drive. However, even here, hard choices have to be made in view of budgetary constraints that affect even the most affluent of nations. One just cannot fritter away precious resources on a bit of everything. If we talk of air superiority and even air dominance, we have to decide if we are going to aim for control of the air through ASFs and supporting systems or air denial strategy, on the lines of sea denial with submarines and mines, with largely static SAMs. One just needs to introspect on the amount of resources, both money and manpower, invested in SAMs in the context of the kind of wars we are likely to be involved in to arrive at the right choices in terms of assets or even the right mix of assets. In conclusion, it is reiterated that the IAF needs to urgently revisit its doctrinal emphasis and to rework its future strategy and then its needs to acquire the requisite combat support systems and force multipliers, apart from only acquiring combat aircraft. Our existing combat platforms must be properly equipped and regular training of all operators initiated for any future air dominance missions as also for standoff precision attacks to improve the success rate of all such missions. Apart from cost-effective force multipliers, the IAF may also need to renew its focus on simulation for regular and repeated training of all operators in such missions to optimise utilisation of its already depleted assets and preserve these for the remaining essential training – and actual hostilities. Such large-force BVR engagements require simulator sets with tens of plugged-in modules to give realistic training to controllers as well as the pilots. To the best of this writer’s knowledge, such simulators have not been built anywhere in the world so far and the IAF could take a lead in developing these systems indigenously. The doctrinal emphasis on air dominance of the IAF needs to be converted into an appropriate strategy with commensurate tactics and training. For basic combat training of all combat pilots while enhancing flight safety, measures earlier recommended may also be revisited.
References
In this Article, Air Marshal (R) Harish Masand has referred to his earlier writings ‘The Real Thing’ in Vayu II/2019; ‘The F-16 vs MiG-21 Bison: More Questions than Answers’ ‘Lessons Learnt: A year after Pulwama’; ‘Stemming the Slide’ in the Vayu; Arvind Gupta, Director VIF on Significance of Exercise Gagan Shakti-2018; Air Commodore Kaiser Tufail, ‘Rafale’s Impact on IAF’s Air Power Capabilities’ Siddiqui Huma, ‘India to get S-400 Triumf air defence system in 2021’; Grant Rebecca on ‘The Bekaa Valley War, Air Force Magazine’, June 2002.