One can argue that the era of tanks is over! The Nagorno–Karabakh, Russia–Ukraine, and Israel– Gaza wars have flooded social media with photos of destroyed tanks. While one can argue tanks have become more vulnerable than ever, it also should be understood that the tanks are going nowhere immediately. However, rather than discussing the credibility of a tank in a modern context, we will first try to find out the major threats a tank might face on the battlefield and possible solutions to combat them.
Threat 1: KE rounds
One of the biggest and most effective anti–tank threats is the armour–piercing fin–stabilized discarding sabot (APFSDS), or kinetic energy rounds. It’s a metal dart that is fired through the main gun of a tank and uses only kinetic energy to penetrate the target. In simple words, it’s a bullet for the tanks! Modern KE rounds use high–density materials like tungsten carbide (ex: 3BM42 Mango, 3BM60 Svinet–2, DM73) or depleted uranium (ex: M829A4) to achieve maximum penetration. Modern tank guns fire at a high supersonic or near hypersonic speed! Hence, these rounds could defeat the enemy armor as a hot knife goes through butter! While it’s a highly lethal solution, the effect gradually decreases with distance and increased angle. Hence, the sloping angle of the turret is a feature of many tanks, which increases the line–of–sight (LOS) armor thickness. While the use of high–hardness steel (HHS) along with rolled homogeneous armour (RHA) can decrease the effect, the latest western and Russian KE rounds are powerful enough to nullify efforts.
In latest news, Nexter qualifies the new SHARD 120mm APFSDS tank ammunition. SHARD is “the solution” for all NATO 120mm tanks to defeat modern MBTs (by 15%) and has been designed by KNDS to bring 120mm APFSDS tungsten alloy ammunition “to the next level of performance against all modern MBTs”.
Threat 2: HEAT warhead
The high explosive anti–tank, also known as the HEAT warhead, is the most common kind of threat to a tank. Such a warhead has a thin metal liner inside in the shape of an explosion charge. When the charge is detonated, the liner collapses rapidly, resulting in a high speed jet of liquid known as an explosively formed penetrator (EFP), allowing it to pierce through the enemy armour. It must be remembered that such EFP doesn’t melt the armour but rather pierces through it at hypersonic speed like a KE round. The main advantage of a HEAT round to KE is that the effect of HEAT doesn’t get affected by the distance, unlike KE. Hence, such a warhead is widely used on various different platforms. One can find them in tank ammunition (ex: 3BK29, M830A1), tank launched missiles (ex: 9M119 Invar, LAHAT), vehicle mounted ATGM (ex: Nag, Brimstone), heli–launched ATGM (ex: SANT, Hellfire, Vikhr), man–portable ATGM (ex: Javelin, Spike, Amogha III), lighter shoulder–launched ammunition (ex: RPG 7, Carl Gustaf), or even off route mines (ex: PARM 2). The long list of ammunition is given not to bore the reader but to help understand the wide range of uses.
Javelin
While the RHA could be a solution to an old generation KE round, it gets defeated by the plasma jet quite easily. Hence, composite armour was developed to address the issue. The composite armour uses layers of alumina, ceramic, rubber, fiberglass etc, which are then sandwiched between the RHA layers. Thus, the combined armour works well against both the KE and heat. However, a bigger HEAT warhead can still defeat the armour. Hence, there is a necessity for add on armour. The most widely used passive counter to it is explosive reactive armour (ERA). Multiple sheets of explosives are sandwiched between two metal plates. When struck by an anti–tank projectile, the explosives get detonated, propelling the metal plates in opposite directions. While the movement opposite the direction of the jet disrupts the formation, it also increases the distance covered by the shaped charge. Thus, the effect gets nullified or at least decreased. The concept was pioneered by the Soviets, but it was Israel that used it successfully during combat (“Blazer” during the 1982 Lebanon War).
Namica
ERA is now used widely and has seen evolution through the ages. To address threats of different degrees, Russia has developed several different types of ERA. The latest “Relikt” or “Monolith” uses thicker metal shells to withstand KE rounds as well. Besides, Russia has fielded soft–bag ERA, which is stripped of any metal coverage to reduce weight and work as a reinforced measure against HEAT warheads. To enhance protection further, a new type of large ERA box is also being fielded. Such a box carries 4S22/4S24 elements. But all of these measures are mainly to work against heat rounds and a desperate attempt against tandem strikes. However, mounting ERA itself is not a safe bait. The explosive nature poses a threat to the nearby friendly crew. Hence, an alternative ‘Non– energetic Reactive Armour’ (NERA) has been developed where non–metallic materials (like specialised rubber, polymers etc) are sandwiched and laminated between metal plates. It works on the principle of the bulging effect and sheering stress against an incoming projectile. However, defence against lighter HEAT warheads like those used in RPG type ammunition could be a little easier. For that, slat armour (also known as bar, mesh, and cage armor) can be used. The RPG type ammunition has a typical shape with a sharp nose at the front. The front point carries piezoelectric crystals followed by a fuse. Upon impact, the crystal gets crushed, triggering the activation of the fuse, which triggers the destination. So, in simple words, the slat armour aims to disrupt the triggering. The typical netting of the armour doesn’t allow the warhead to pass, but the nose! The strike either doesn’t crush the crystal or triggers a short circuit, disabling the fuse. This is comparatively easy to make and can be found in a range of forms, from crude to the latest sophisticated one with reinforced nodes.
Modern ATGM with bigger and tandem warheads can do much bigger damage, defeating both ERA and reinforced slat armour. Hence, to combat the threat, an Active Protection System (APS) has been developed. There are two types of APS systems. The first one is dubbed a soft kill system, which doesn’t destroy the incoming warhead but rather disrupts the command guidance (ex: Shtora 1, MUSS). Such systems emit infrared lights, mimicking the enemy missile exhaust. Thus, the SACLOS feeds the wrong guidance, veering the missile off course. The second kind of APS, known as the hard kill system, prefers to defeat the threat itself (ex: Trophy, Iron Fist, Arena M, etc.). Such systems have millimeter wave radars (MMW) to detect an incoming projectile. The system then releases explosively forged projectiles (ex: Trophy) or explosive projectile interceptors (ex: Iron Fist) to defeat incoming projectiles.
Trophy APS
Another interesting defensive aid is the laser warning system. This is used against enemy laser guided threats. Such devices not only detect laser sources of illuminators, designators or rangefinders. Modern systems are integrated to detect radar guided and radio guided threats as well. It can respond adequately by launching a smoke screen, disruptin g both IR and laser guidance. Such a smoke screen also offers discretion against protection from visual detection, allowing the platform to quickly move amidst a thick screen of smoke. Thus, there is a kind of soft kill method as well. Hence, many new APS, like Afghanit, use a hybrid of both soft kill and hard kill methods. Interestingly, tanks with even hard kill APS have been found destroyed in combat. A Russian T–80UM2 with Drozd 2 was destroyed during the ongoing Russia–Ukraine conflict, and multiple Merkava 4 tanks with Trophy were destroyed during an Israeli military operation after the 7 October 2023 terrorist attack. Still, it will be absolutely wrong to assume the APS didn’t work, as the Russian tank was destroyed by artillery firing. And the exact condition of the Israeli tanks is not known. While the APS is the best possible solution against enemy projectiles, it has some limitations as well. But we will focus on only one. Many modern ATGMs are designed to strike enemy tanks not from the side but from the top or roof of the tank! Obviously, the roof is the thinnest area of a tank. Hence, defeating that part is quite easy. However, various methods are taken to increase protection in that area. Russians mount ERA, Israel adds additional armor plates, and Germany uses ‘Igelpanzerung’ (also known as hedgehog armor due to the spiked appearance). Though their efficiency is limited to only bomblets, DPICM or smaller EFP, is nevertheless irrefutably an important measure.
Threat 3: Drones
Unmanned aerial systems have evolved enough to be deployed for various roles. While medium– to large tactical drones (ex: MQ–9, Bayraktar TB2, Orion) are highly capable of delivering munitions, they are highly susceptible to enemy air defence in a contested airspace. Though these are highly efficient platforms, they are costly enough to be deployed in mass to successfully neutralise threats on the ground. And exactly why smaller drones and loitering munitions came into the picture. These are cheap enough to be built in huge numbers, which can easily overwhelm conventional methods of air defence. Kamikaze drones (ex: Harop, Lancet, Switchblade, Shahed–136) are guided flying warheads that can loiter until the best potential target is selected. A high–speed, steep dive can strike at the top of the armoured platforms. But most notorious has been the first–person view (FPV) enabled quad, hexa, or octocopters (ex: Aerorozvidka, DJI), which carry light ammunition (it could grenade, RPG warhead, and even a modified anti–tank mine) only to drop on unsuspecting troop positions, light vehicles or armored platforms with an opened hatch susceptible to a deadly strike to the stored ammunition. Bigger platforms are comparatively easier to identify. But such smaller systems are not less than a nuisance, as traditional defences are not available against them. They could be mass deployed, tag multiple targets, and switch positions quickly before the enemy can react! When deployed together in a swarm, they can quickly overpower enemy strongholds without modified air defence. India has quickly realised the threat and invested heavily both in achieving similar goals as well as in a defence against enemy swarm attacks. Some small UAS (ex: Eleron–3SV, Orlan–10) are specially designed for reconnaissance, surveillance and identification; they have even been used to guide artillery strikes on enemy positions. Thus, the artillery strikes are gradually becoming more accurate and more target specific. Hence, threats against unsuspecting armoured platforms have increased multiplefold.
IAI Harop loitering munition
Such platforms gained notoriety during the Nagorno– Karabakh War of 2020. To combat the emerging threats, Russia quickly fielded a slat–armour–type structure to the roof–top of their tanks, definitively known as the ‘Cope Cage’! Widely used in the war in Ukraine, it has resulted in a mixed performance. Indeed, these systems have saved crucial lives. But like any other measure, it has limitations. Two prime concerns are the inability to withstand a bigger warhead and the coverage of the vehicle. But remember, it was never developed to defeat top–attack ATGM or artillery shells and is working just fine against smaller FPV kamikaze drones. Israel has also been found to have mass deployed similar weapons during the ongoing war against Hamas. Russian recently started fielding an improved variant enforced with ERA bricks. While this has been one method to defend, another one that has gained momentum is drone jammers! Along with hand–held measures, several vehicle mounted jammers (ex: Volnorez, Saniya, Triton, Cupol) have been a regular sight in the Russia–Ukraine war. However, a credible result has yet to be assessed. Reports of failures are frequent. But this is mostly attributed to the poor quality of the built–in frequency range. Nevertheless, mass deployment is a new impetus for integrated defence. While vehicle–mounted remote–weapon systems (RWS) are also being improved for hard kill action along with specialised ammunition, various APS are being improved by corresponding developers to act against such threats.
Threat 4: Drawbacks in the Tank Design
Amidst the war, Western and Russian media purportedly have flooded social media and news outlets with images of burned and destroyed tanks on the other side. But images of destroyed Russian tanks with uprooted turrets are much more frequent to find. Whatever weapons have hit the Russian tanks, they have fallen prey to the “jack–in–the–box” effect. The ‘T’ series uses an autoloader, and ammunition is arranged in a carousel. The crew sits directly on the auto–loader itself! A successful penetration by any anti–tank round is likely to hit the storage, causing cooking off one or multiple ammo. Even being hit by fragmentation or sapling can trigger one. This leads to massive and instantaneous pressure inside the turret, along with continuous detonation of other stored ammunition in a chain reaction and conflagration, resulting in a violent blow to the turret. Western countries tried to solve the problem by storing the ammunition inside a ‘containerised ammunition bin individual system’ (CABIS) and blow–off panel (BOP), which reduced the risk of ammo trigger and chain reaction. Still, the Leopard 2A6 has been found to have fallen as hull ammunition storage was breached! The only difference to the Russian situation is that crew survivability is much higher. The US has taken safety to another level by placing CABIS itself inside a blast door! As an alternative, new designs prefer bustle storage or placing crew inside an insulated compartment.
Front of the Arjun Mk.1A MBT
Threat 5: Artillery and Mines
The biggest threat to the tank is still the artillery. Artillery still holds the number one position as the most notorious ‘tank–killer’! It can be often observed that the precise artillery strike has obliterated an advancing armoured column while a few surviving platforms are destroyed afterwards with the help of kamikaze drones! In fact, with the emergence of guiding drones, artillery has become much more accurate and, hence, deadlier. If not a ‘total kill’, the fragmentation could lead to the ‘mission ‘kill’ destroying the mounted optics, thus stripping the tank of crucial situational awareness. Along with this, anti–tank mines (ex: TM–62), IED, and off– route mines (ex: PARM 2) are a big headache. It has been noticed that IED can have a devastating effect on a tank, including the deaths of crew members. The minimum, a ‘mobility ‘kill’ is also possible. And on a battlefield, a stranded tank is as good as a dead one!
The only way to stop the enemy from firing their artillery is to destroy them! It will be possible with only a successful mass airstrike on the enemy position. Now, how to conduct a successful air operation in a potential contested airspace is a different subject! But there’s no other way to address the issue without neutralising enemy artillery. While dedicated anti–mine operations will be needed to prepare a safe route for armour advancement, it could be done by reinforcing platforms with anti–mine equipment (ex: mine rollers, flail, track–width mine plough, rotating chain, surface clearance device) or using special methods like mine–clearing line charging (ex: M58, UR–77) and mine–field breaching systems (ex: Python). To combat threats from IED, a dedicated vehicle–mounted jammer (ex: RP–377VM) has been developed. But more than the jammer, a better way is to detect, identify, and neutralise the threat with a dedicated platform, preferably with the help of an unmanned system. While the traditional threats to a tank are getting deadlier day by day, the emerging new threats are gaining momentum through rapid evolution. It will take some time to find dedicated solutions to the threats. The immediate solution might not be the best one. For example, Russian tanks are designed as medium platforms, in sharp contrast to the existing Western designs. But, amidst conflict, they have been bulked up with reinforcement. One can identify all around slat armour, multi–layer ERA reinforcement, ERA coverage to the gun mantlet, the turret ring, the lower front plate, and even the engine compartment, the integration of a drone and an IED jammer, and yet fall prey to the threats. Every battle leads to the evolution of tank design and the emergence of new technologies. So, in the near future, we should be prepared to witness tanks embracing new shapes!
Article by Sankalan Chattopadhyay Twitter: @vinoddx9