Crossing of Madhumati, Capture of Kamarkhali and Surrender of Pak 9 Inf Div
Back to Madhumati
My Squadron less two troops were placed under command 62 Mountain Brigade and ordered to move back to Madhumati, where 5 Maratha Light Infantry was holding western bank of Madhumati. We covered approximately 100 kms in about 8 hours or so. In the meantime to make up the tank losses suffered at Kushtia, my regiment sent two troops from B Squadron under Maj Chakraverty (Chuks) a brave and a very fine officer. B Squadron had already taken part in few battles under 9 Infantry Division and acquitted themselves with honour. These two troops were placed under command 7 Mountain Brigade. The Eastern bank of Madhumati was held by two battalions of Pak Army, with elements of recce and support battalion and artillery. On arrival, we were welcomed by heavy shelling. The boys had got so used to shelling that by listening to piercing whistle sound of shell through the air, they could guess likely location where the shell is likely to land. If the shell was coming close to their location, their reaction was, “Oh Sxxt” and they would hit the ground. I had just got back from recce of Madhumati looking for crossing places to watch this fun. I was very tired and sat on ground leaning on to sprocket of my tank and dozed off. After a little while, my tank driver woke me up with a hot cup of tea. This tea is very distinct from normal tea. It has a bit of kerosene oil, diesel “flavour” with plenty of sugar and it is served hot. One is tempted to ask for another round. It is at this time that a man carrying dead body of a young woman around 20 years or so came and laid it near the tank. He went away and returned after ten minutes carrying the dead body of a newly born baby. He was crying and trying to convey something which we could not understand. My boys gave him some water and he became calm. My Mukti Bahini fighter narrated his sad story. “The previous night three Pak soldiers had come to his cottage, tied him and his wife and raped this young lady who had just delivered this baby. Next morning, villagers came and untie both of them but till then, both mother and child were dead. A week back, his son and son-in-law had been taken away by Pak soldiers for labour work and not returned. It is believed some were shot dead. This harrowing and sad incident upset us. We could do nothing.
I was summoned to headquarter 62 Mountain Brigade where plans for crossing of Madhumati and capture of Kamarkhali were discussed. I got back after the discussion and ordered my boys to carry out all the 18 pre- floatation checks. Madhumati was a formidable choppy river which was 500 yards wide, with depth of 15-20 feet, water current of 4 to 5 knots and steep banks. Engineers had done a good job in providing this data. The plan was 7 Mountain Brigade to hold Western Bank of Madhumati with one battalion, establish firm base on the far bank of the river by morning 15 December and assist 62 Mountain Brigade in the capture of Kamarkhali. 62 Mountain Brigade to affect crossing in the North during Night 14/15 December and clear enemy opposition upto road Magura-Faridpur and resume advance on axis Kamarkhali - Goalundo Ghat sooner but not later than first light 17 December. It was a pincer move, with 62 Mountain Brigade in the North and 7 Mountain Brigade in the South. Two troops of B Squadron tanks were allotted to 7 Mountain Brigade and A Squadron 45 Cavalry less two troops were placed under command 62 Mountain Brigade for battle of Madhumati/ Kamarkhali.
7 Mountain Brigade with one Battalion and a troop of tanks crossed Madhumati River from the south and established behind Kamarkhali. Remaining tanks of B Squadron gave fire support from the west bank. Commander 62 Mountain Brigade responsible for the northern pincer rightly appreciated that any delay in crossing of Madhumati will give enemy chance to consolidate his defences further on this very formidable water obstacle. The plan to cross over had been discussed with me earlier. His plan envisaged to capture Arpara/ Kamarkhali with 2/9 GR with tanks giving fire support. At mid night, on 14/15 December he decided to cross over Madhumati river. According to Commander, the mother of all battles was crossing of Madhumati and capture of Kamarkhali. Two Battalions of the Pakistan 9 division had taken up positions on the far bank at Kamarkhali/ Arpara. It was a difficult decision to take as any delay could bring international pressure on India for a cease fire. There were indications of American 7th fleet heading for Indian Ocean. I quote from “History of the 9th Gorkha Rifles, Indo- Pak War: 1971 page 201”. Brig (Dr) SK Sinha writes the description of how the tanks crossed River Madhumati deserves to be told. In the words of Brig Rajendra Nath (Later Maj Gen), the Squadron had already carried out pre floatation checks and boys were in high spirits. The brave squadron commander (Maj PK Batra) sat in the driver’s seat leading by example with me on the deck of leading tank. With prayers on our lips, the leading tank plunged into the river. With great skill and dexterity, the squadron commander moved through the choppy river guided by recce troop. The gradient on the far bank was steep but luck favours the brave. The tanks were across the river with the brave Gorkhas (2/9 Gorkha Rifles) following up in country boats. It was a harrowing experience. “This was the first instance of amphibious tanks swimming across a river obstacle under battle conditions and water current of 5 knots. It was a major achievement in the employment of PT-76 tanks to cross a formidable water obstacle under battle conditions. The presence of tanks on the far bank had a tremendous effect on the morale of the troops”, according to historian Brig (Dr) SK Sinha (retd). Personally for me, it was a great challenge as there was to be no failure, the success of the whole operation depended on tanks getting across and supporting the attacks by brave infantry soldiers. The tanks and infantry battalions in both pincers were across Madhumati river. 22 Rajputs with two troops of tanks established a road block behind the enemy by 1100 hrs 15 December. The brave Gorkhas of 2/9 Gorkha Rifles supported by Maj Chakraverty (Chucks) tanks attacked ARPARA on the morning of 15 December. The enemy offered stiff resistance but could not hold on against the Gurkhas and with some accurate shooting by tanks. Chucks supporting the attacks handled his tanks like a maestro as a series of attacks were launched in succession with support of tanks and all were successful. However, destiny had something different for this brave soldier. One of his tanks got bogged down during a lull in the battle. With total disregard to his personal safety, he got off his tank to supervise the recovery and to tell 2/9 Gorkha Rifles boys to move away from tanks as tanks would draw enemy’s fire. Suddenly a mortar bomb landed behind him and he was grievously wounded. His loss was another big blow to me, as I had not yet recovered from Kushtia shock. Chucks was a brave compassionate and gentleman officer loved and respected by all in the Regiment. For us he is “Hero” of Kamarkhali. He was evacuated and finally boarded out as he had fractured his spinal cord. A great loss to 45 Cavalry and army.
ARPARA was captured by 1400 hrs on 15 December, with my boys supporting a hard fought battle. We received reports that enemy was escaping by using a track north of 22 Rajput road block. Commander 62 Mountain Brigade ordered me to move with Company of 5 Maratha Light Infantry to establish another road block to trap the enemy. I took one tank from one of my tank troops and we established the road block by 1600 hrs. We saw approximately 50 Pak soldiers approaching our road block. I could feel strong sense of revenge amongst our boys for Kushtia massacre. The tanks (I too sat on gunners seat to kill these Ba xxxxxs) and 5 Maratha Light Infantry boys opened fire and more than 30 Pak soldiers lay dead. I called it a “Savage Revenge”. After last light, the Pakistanis launched yet another attack and it was repulsed with heavy casualties to them. They made yet another attempt on 16 December morning to dislodge us but failed miserably. Finally, they gave up and surrendered to 62 Mountain Brigade. It was a great experience to withstand four counter attacks at night, launched with fury and fire. PT76 has limited night capability, yet we acquitted with honour. At this surrender event, Gen Ansari, GOC Pakistan 9 Infantry Division admitted to Commander 62 Mountain Brigade that they could not believe that tanks will get across the formidable Madumati river and that too at night. One of the Pakistan officers complimented the A Squadron by calling us, “Tank Commandos” as narrated by Commander 62 Mountain Brigade. The credit goes to B Squadron boys too. I was ordered to advance on road Kamarkhali- Faridpur with 5 Maratha Light Infantry. We resumed our advance on road Kamarkhali-Faridpur. The Squadron including one troop of B Squadron was advancing with two troops up, one troop each astride the axis. The leading troop leader came on radio to inform me that a Pakistani jeep with a white flag was approaching towards our location. The Squadron halted the advance and deployed tactically with instructions to carry out speculative fire if need arises. I came on to the road to meet the occupants of this jeep which halted a few yards from my tank. I met the GSO 1, Lt. Col. Mansoor-Ul-Haq of Pakistan 9 Infantry Division, who had come to work out surrender formalities with the Indian Army.
He was a very smart, soft-spoken gentleman. We disarmed him and the soldiers accompanying him. My boys searched the jeep and handed over a book wrapped in green silken cloth to me. As a soldier I felt sorry for him as the worst form of humiliation for a soldier is to surrender. The colonel requested if he could keep the book as it was the holy Quran. I touched the book to my forehead as a sign of reverence and handed over the holy Quran without hesitation. This little gesture was much appreciated by him and he said, “We really appreciate the Indian Armed Forces for their respect for all religions and being so secular “. I felt very proud of our culture, our country and our armed forces. We chatted for quite some time about futility of wars between our two nations with same habits, culture, we were one country, blamed the politicians for this mess etc etc. We offered them a cup of tea which was politely declined. In the meantime, a message had been passed to higher headquarters about the surrender and staff from division and brigade headquarters had landed up. It was a great moment for my regiment, squadron and me but sadly it turned out to be a “Tamasha” for some as they did not appreciate the sanctity of this great moment. By this time, some Pakistani officers had also come. As I stood alone watching, an elderly Pakistani officer walked upto me, introduced himself and said, “Maj Batra, your armoured corps officers on both sides have strong spirit-do-corps and affinity, I’ve a son who is in 4 Cavalry of Pakistan and I’ve had no news about him for over a month. We have no news about war in the Western side. Would you be kind enough to find out about 4 Cavalry. I’ve been having sleepless nights worrying about safety and well-being of my only child”. I promised to do my best and find out about this regiment. My GOC was a happy man and invited me to accompany him. He drove the open jeep and I sat in front seat with him. As we crossed the Sikh Light Infantry boys who were coming from the opposite direction, GOC told them that the Pakistanis have surrendered. One of the boys mistaking me to be a Pakistani officer almost hit me when the GOC let fly some choicest of abuses in Punjabi to tell him,” Yeh to mera Squadron Commander hai”. Unfortunately, I was wearing a Khaki overall as worn by Pakistanis instead of our black overalls. We laughed it off! On reaching the division headquarter, I rang up a friend in command headquater at Calcutta and requested him to find out whereabouts of 4 Cavalry. He was very kind and appreciated the concern of a father. Next day early morning, I got a message informing me that 4 Cavalry had not come to battle. I immediately went and met this officer and gave him the good news. He was so touched and moved and hugged me and kissed my hands with tears of joy rolling down both his cheeks and kept blessing me. This was a moment difficult to describe by both of us.
I felt good as I was instrumental in bringing a cheer in some one’s life. I was summoned to division headquater and on reaching there I was informed that my Squadron had to move immediately to Suratgarh. I looked up to the skies and wondered on the irony---from marshy graves of Bangladesh to scorpion/snake infested sand dunes of Rajasthan. Since, I was at heaquarters, I decided to pay final respects to GOC as courtesy demanded. He thanked me profusely with parting words,” I’ll be recommending you and your boys for gallantry/awards”. As I was driving back, I wondered why we ‘tank’ men are treated like step children. After a dozen of actions/ battles at Div/Brigade level including two road blocks facing five counter attacks to dislodge us, crossing Madumati under enemy’s nose on a pitch dark night covering 700 kms without a single breakdown in 20 days of war and only thing you carry is false promises. We moved to Suratgarh and got busy to understand our next operational role and carry out recce. I sent my boys on spot of leave. Finally, in February 72, I went on short leave to Ramgarh where our families were staying. A prisoner-of-war camp had also been established there. One evening as I went for a walk, I stopped at the camp and met the Pakistani subedar major and enquired about their welfare. He said,” Hazoor Sab theek hai, koi gila yah shikait nahin, ek chhoti urz hai”, I said “farmaiye”, “Hazoor har subah hamain is gane ke saath uthaya jata hai “maar dia jaye ya chhor diya jai bol tere saath kya salook Kia jaye” (translated, should we leave you or kill you. Tell us what kind of treatment you want.) I assured him that we follow Geneva conventions unlike their army and they will go back to their country and requested the adjutant of the camp to not to play this number.
Major (later Maj Gen.) Pramod K Batra commanded ‘A’ Squadron 45 Cavalry during the 1971 War