During height of the Cold War in the’ 60s, strategic importance of the Indian Ocean, and its littoral states grew for both the US and USSR. Asia had emerged as a ‘hotbed’ for proxy wars, with directly participating in conflicts, the focus increasingly on the third world. Before the mid-60s, USN SSBNs were equipped with Polaris A1 and A2 missiles, which had a max range of 2600 and 2800 km respectively. Because of this limited range, the Indian Ocean was not considered an effective patrolling area, but following the deployment of A3s in 1964, the SSBNs could hit their targets (primarily Soviet) even from the Arabian Sea. This coupled with the US constructing a low frequency communication station in North West Cape, Western Australia to contact their patrolling subs, convinced the Soviet Union that USN deployment in Indian Ocean was imminent. In 1968, the British Prime Minister Harold Wilson announced the decision to withdraw from Britain’s major military bases East of the Suez, owing to a multitude of reasons. This pull-out, although announced in 1968, was to happen by 1971. The Soviet deployment in the region quickly followed this announcement. Soviet Naval presence in the Indian Ocean region first began when Moscow dispatched a 4-ship flotilla from Vladivostok on a goodwill visit to six Indian Ocean littoral states, being India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Kenya, South Yemen and Somalia in March 1968. The flotilla was or would become the 8th Operational (Indian Ocean) Squadron. USN deployment in the region had started much earlier, with Seventh Fleet deployment in the Indian Ocean by April 1964 as the Concord Squadron. Still, by 1969, the Soviets had gained access to several port facilities in the region and the flotilla spent most of its time in the north-western portion of the ocean. After that, the Soviets steadily increased their ship-days in the region from about 1000 in 1968, reaching 9000 by 1974 and about 11,800 by 1980. Numerous reasons have been given as to why the Soviets finally decided to deploy in the region, the most apparent being to counter US influence there. Other reasons that can be argued include keeping Chinese threat at bay. The Sino Soviet split had happened in the 60s, and by 1972 Nixon had visited China, alarming the Soviets to a serious Chinese threat to the Russian Far East. An Indian Ocean deployment gave another area to respond from in case of hostilities and to ensure connection with Siberia. Yet another could be that the Soviets simply wanted to exploit the power vacuum left after the British pullout or a simple logistical one: protecting shipping lanes in the region and disrupting the enemies. The exploitation of such a power vacuum was surely on the minds of Soviet planners’, even if primary motivation would have been any one of those mentioned above. Any such deployment would certainly allow them to exert some power over littoral states, through goodwill visits and if need be through ‘gunboat diplomacy’ as many littoral countries were “non-aligned”.
The diplomatic aspect was routinely clear with the deployment, when the Soviet flotilla would make port calls, conduct surveillance and try to improve diplomatic relations to “sympathetic countries” as also a show of force to improve military perception of the Soviet Union in the region. Nevertheless, no reason was ever officially provided, but one could assume a mix of these. The ‘Indian Ocean Squadron’ or officially designated the 8th Operational (Indian Ocean) Squadron with home port at Vladivostok, was activated on August 1968 and remained operational till collapse of the Soviet Union. While the squadron was operational, it automatically assumed operational command of any Soviet ship operating in the Indian Ocean Region. Strength of the deployment was not a constant and would often change. According to the CIA, the core flotilla usually consisted of a destroyer, 2 frigates, 2 minesweepers, 1 amphibious ship, 1 SSK and around 7 auxiliary support ships including a merchant tanker. Sometimes the flotilla would be joined by a cruiser as well. Allen Stout mentions the standard strength of Indian Ocean Squadron as 1 cruiser, 2 destroyers, 1 attack submarine, 2 frigates, 1 minesweeper, 2 amphibious ships, 1 cruise missile submarine, 1 intelligence collector, 10 auxiliary ships and 1 hydrographic research vessel. The strength of the force did vary, increasing during the period of hostilities in the region such as during the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971 or the 1973 Oil Crisis or Ethiopian-Somalian conflict of 1977 and waned in times of relative peace. Interestingly, the force spent considerable time during 1972–1975 for mine clearing and salvage operations in Chittagong, involving up to 15 ships immediately after the war. Otherwise prior to and even for the most part of 1973, the ships had spent most of their time anchored in ports.
The ships usually belonged to the Pacific fleet but would sometimes be from the western fleet too. The logistics support to the force was solely under the Pacific fleet. The ships transferring from the western fleets to Pacific would also serve a few months in Indian Ocean, making their sort of a buffer deployment, before transfer. Throughout its deployment the 8th Operational squadron would conduct mainly Naval Diplomacy as peacetime mission but should there have been war, its mission would have been to interdict Western reinforcements and help any Soviet offensive. The show of force happened quite many times during the deployment, even coming face to face with USN vessels sometime. After the December 1971 war broke out, naval deployments by both US and Soviets reached a high, with the US having 14 ships, British 21 ships and Soviets having 26 ships deployed in the region. The British deployment was ostensibly in the region to help in withdrawal from the Persian Gulf (“East of Suez”) and not in connection with the war. The Soviets, although in response to the both USN and Royal Navy’s deployments, had sent 2 task forces of then as own to counter both of them with each task force configured for anti-carrier operations. Their quick reaction to US forces, and Task Force 74’s subsequent diversion from the Bay of Bengal after being aware of Soviet response, would have logically resulted in an increment in their credibility of power projection after the war, “staring down the ‘imperialists’ in the region”. The Soviets certainly conducted surveillance of annual CENTO naval exercises in 1973–74 while in the region. There was a popular (but incredulous) story about the Indian Navy using Russian language to communicate, so as to fool Pakistani intelligence during the 1971 war. After collapse of the Soviet Union, almost all aspects of Russian military suffered drastically. The political and economic climate was unsuitable to sustain the behemoth that had been the Soviet military. Defence expenditure was reduced drastically, many ships scrapped and many in construction continued in their berths for years to come as construction of new ships was effectively stopped. The Pacific Fleet lost many of its vessels, and subsequently the 8th Operational (Indian Ocean) Squadron soon met its demise and was officially disbanded on December 1992. With its disbandment, the Russians lost their presence in the Indian Ocean.
Shwetabh Singh (Twitter @singhshwetabh71)