Consistent with its decades-old assertive policies for the region, the Chinese Dragon has once again, flaunted its fangs, a lot more perilously than ever before in the last many years. Gravely beset within its own boundaries, dousing the pandemic Covid-19 that it pushed onto an unsuspecting world, China could not have found a worse time to trigger uncalled for tensions with the other Asian giant, its large neighbour, India. That China is currently under pressure on many fronts, attributable to its strategic over-reach and an overly megalomaniac regional and global world-view, may have tied itself up in many knots. That China’s unbridled ambitions may prove to be its undoing in the foreseeable future is now well nigh a possibility.
From 5 May 2020 onwards, Chinese forces have transgressed in Eastern Ladakh at multiple points: along the Galwan Valley, Hot Springs area and the scenic Pangong Tso. China had earlier crossed into Niku La in Northern Sikkim from where it then pulled back, with both sides utilising the existing border management protocols to resolve the matter. However, towards its own side in the Sikkim region, Chinese forces have reportedly been improving their defensive posture and reinforced troops with heavy equipment.
Media reports have displayed commercially available satellite imagery, showing China had positioned two brigades in the Galwan River Valley with over 5000 soldiers, established helicopter landing grounds, tents, moved heavy vehicles including tanks and mechanised infantry carriers upto the Line of Actual Control (LAC), plus positioning artillery in its territory. Chinese troops also appeared to have tried to divert waters of the Galwan river from flowing into the Shyok river across the LAC. In the Galwan Valley, Chinese troops appear to have occupied some heights which dominate India’s recently built strategic, Darbuk-Shyok-Daulat Beg Oldi highway. China has also upgraded its civil and military airfield at Ngari Giinsa, just 60 kms east of the LAC and reportedly deployed J-11s at this airfield. In addition, it has reportedly activated airfields at Hotan and Kashgar whilst unconfirmed reports suggest that PLAAF aircraft may have staged through Gilgit and Skardu in POK. In the Depsang Plains, north west of the Pangong Tso, Chinese troops have reportedly also concentrated in strength which threatens the IAF’s high altitude airstrip at Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO) in India’s Sub Sector North (SSN), just below the Karakoram Pass.
Although the Chinese have repeatedly committed transgressions across the LAC in the Ladakh sector even the past many years, the Galwan Valley has witnessed Chinese intrusions for the first time. The Indian Army swiftly moved troops to face the ominous Chinese build-up and both sides are now facing each other in strength, virtually eyeball-to-eyeball. Deployments have continued and which way such a confrontation will shape up is anybody’s guess. Meanwhile there are media reports that Pakistan is building up across the LOC to India’s west in the Gilgit-Baltistan region, as expected. This collusive build up requires India to remains occupied in these north-western areas and their hope that India is unable to switch troops from opposite the LOC facing Pakistan to the LAC facing the Chinese!
With the world (and China itself) reeling under the deadly pandemic and mounting of fatalities with no end in sight, what has been engaging the minds of strategic analysts of many nations, is this timing: what is the strategic and tactical intent of China’s deadly transgressions? Chinese objectives across the LAC appear to be serious enough to prompt US President Donald Trump to offer mediation between the two Asian giants. That the United States and China are themselves engaged in a serious verbal confrontation with the US directly blaming China for the pandemic, which has caused over a lakh of fatalities in the US, is another serious situation. The US (and other nations), are certainly aware of India’s consistent policy of aversion towards any mediation by a third country in what India considers its internal matter, so predictably India promptly declined the US President’s offer.
Earlier, the US has directly criticised China for its role in spreading the lethal pandemic, not cautioning the world about this in time. China’s reluctance to allow medical authorities from the WHO and other nations to visit its Wuhan laboratories where allegedly the virus had germinated and spread across the globe, has earned China the indignation and anger of the world, many nations seriously considering the review of their economic ties with China. India has already begun to seriously downgrade in its economic ties with China, cancelling many infrastructural contracts and banning scores of security-risk Apps.
It is clear to all India-China watchers that despite the occasional Chinese assertiveness along the 3000+ km India-China mountainous borders, India’s overall reactions have been somewhat restrained over the past many decades. In fact, PM Narendra Modi throughout his tenure has endeavoured to foster friendly relations with China – with mixed results. Even during the serious Doklam crisis (near Sikkim) in September 2017 for over 73 days, when India asserted itself strongly, not a shot was fired despite the tensions of large number of troops facing each other. However, despite India’s determined response during the Doklam crisis, just some weeks after Indian troops had pulled back, the Chinese intruded into Bhutan territory (at the tri junction of Sikkim, Bhutan and Tibet), and have since built fortifications and stationed troops within inside Bhutan territory, leaving India virtually as a bystander.
Prior to the Doklam face-off, India and China had confrontations in the Depsang Plains in 2013 and Chumar in 2014 (both in Ladakh). The most serious confrontation was in 1985 when India, then under the leadership of, PM Rajiv Gandhi and Army Chief, General Sundarji, initiated Op Falcon in October 1986 to eject the Chinese from Sumdurong Chu, north of Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh. This operation alongwith Gen Sundarji’s brainchild, Op Chequerboard, to deploy the Indian Army in strength along the India-China borders were a success in that the Indian Army’s determined moves sent a strong message to the Chinese. India’s strong stand in late 1986 paved the way for a visit by Rajiv Gandhi to China, a first by an Indian PM in nearly 30 years or so. Temperatures between India and China considerably cooled down thereafter and ground work laid for border management protocols between the two Asian giants.
India is now gearing up to the latest and indeed most formidable provocation by China in Ladakh and analysts must be gauging the raison-de-tre of the Chinese moves: are these uncalled for actions a result of annoyance with India for supporting the US and global call for a thorough investigation on origins of the pandemic? India is now assuming chairmanship of the WHO Advisory Board and is likely to accelerate global efforts on ascertaining causes of the pandemic and this may well have bothered China.
With US and China relations currently at abysmally low levels owing to many reasons, including the pandemic slugfest, their trade wars irreconcilable and mounting tensions between the two powers in the South China Sea, does China feel that India is getting too close to the US for China’s comfort? Does China wish to caution India for getting active in a supposedly anti-China formation emerging in the Indo-Pacific region, including the QUAD comprising India, US, Japan and Australia ?
Another possible reason for China’s intransigence towards India over the last few years has been the latter’s refusal to recognize China’s globally ambitious Border and Road Initiative (BRI), particularly the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The latter runs through the disputed region of Gilgit-Baltistan which India claims and thus can never be a party to. Despite China’s President Xi Jingping’s pressure on Indian PM Narendra Modi to join this Chinese initiative, this venture clearly harms Indian strategic interests. In addition, with many foreign industries now planning to move out of China and relocate in other Asian countries, could China be looking at the loss of being the world’s factory now to a rising India and South East Asia?
However, a tactical reason which may have provoked China to threaten India could well be the latter’s improving roads infrastructure in the border region. Over the last 15 years or so, India has been striving to improve its long neglected border roads, particularly that running along the Shyok River till Daulat Beg Oldi which is India’s last military frontier post just below of the Karakoram Pass. India has also completed building of a vital permanent bridge over the Shyok river, well inside Indian territory.
Above all, what puzzles most China watchers is the timing of its upping the ante against India at this juncture. China, apart from the pandemic global opprobrium, is currently facing serious problems for itself in Hong Kong and Xingjian, in the South China Sea, with Taiwan and in Tibet, and importantly, with the USA. Perhaps, as China views India as its serious competitor in Asia, is it merely trying to deflect attention from itself out of all these vexed issues to somewhere that it surmises it may meet with some success and end India’s rise as a major regional power? Western media also suggests that the ‘President for Life’ China’s strongman Xi Jingping perhaps wants to divert the attention of his politburo and the people from the myriad troubles that China is facing and believes that India could be a convenient pushover. However, would China find it prudent to trigger a shooting war with a well prepared India on its border regions, is a question which perplexes most analysts. As the coming weeks (and months) unravel the workings of the enigmatic Chinese, one can assume that the Chinese have taken this step as a cumulative fall-out of all the problems which it currently faces.
By mid-June, both India and China had built up adequate military strength facing each other, and a small incident could conceivably spark a violent conflict. Whenever Ladakh 2020 cools down, either peacefully or otherwise, India will surely be looking at various lessons which emerge, political, military and economic. A serious introspection which in any case must be undertaken is the likely intelligence failure by Indian agencies on allegedly not having detected China’s speedy build up in Eastern Ladakh. India certainly has more than an adequate capability in all forms of intelligence but surprisingly it appears that India’s security establishment has been caught napping. The Centre must also review the current manning arrangements of our border regions as conceptualised in the ‘one border-one force’ enunciated by the Kargil Review Committee. It is strongly felt that in these border regions where there is 24x7 security threat, even in peacetime or a no-war no-peace environment, the Army must be in total operational control. Para-military forces and Central Police Organisations are best suited for internal security responsibilities.
It will be highly imprudent on China’s part to get into a kinetic confrontation with India: our swift and strong military preparedness, combined with a resolute political should deter the Dragon. Dissuasion and deterrence towards an adversary essentially emerge from the sinews of Comprehensive National Power. Despite the grave current economic problems bedeviling the nation, resources will have to found by the government to finance state-of-the–art weaponry and new platform acquisitions. This is certainly the time to truly give a fillip to PM Narendra Modi’s much heralded ‘Make in India’ call which however is lagging behind in implementation. The government also needs to re-energise the not-so-efficient DRDO and India’s extensive ordnance factories sector. It is a pity that despite India having a vibrant and effective private industrial sector genuine partnership between the public-private sectors, this has not resulted in meeting national goals in defence production. This grave anomaly must be understood and measures taken to ensure self-reliance for the nation.
India’s current defence budget which is around 1.60 percent of the GDP is the lowest since the 1962 war debacle, and is woefully inadequate. Successive parliamentary committees on Defence, including those presided over by many BJP leaders have recommended that the defence budget be around 3 percent of our GDP.
India is certainly capable to combat the wily and ambitious Chinese who will surely get a bloody nose, and its global and regional ambitions thwarted in case it takes imprudent steps to ignite any violent conflict with India. Certainly, it is hoped that wisdom will prevail and cordial relations between the two Asian giants to be restored for the benefit of future generations. In any event, India has to face, with all determination and armed strength, China’s bullying tactics. For India this is the hour of reckoning: let’s rise to the occasion.