Some days before the Prime Minister’s address to the nation wherein, amongst other issues, he flagged an ambitious and sorely needed vision of a self-reliant India, the Chief of Defence Staff had highlighted similar sentiments in so far as defence procurement for the Indian armed forces was concerned although some of his observations may well have an impact far beyond issues of mere self-reliance and to the detriment of the fighting man-machine combination.
Earlier, in the interest of indigenisation he had suggested that the Services should accept some systems after trials even if they conformed only to seventy percent of the stipulated service requirements, believing that with further development the industry would improve the system’s performance! The flexibility of accepting a shortfall in operational performance already exists and is best left to the users. The thesis of industry improving system performance after induction is debatable as many other factors like commercial issues intervene and past experience belies this optimism. The HF-24 Marut fighter-bomber aircraft that had the potential, and even participated in the 1971 Indo-Pak conflict, had to be withdrawn from service prematurely for safety reasons. As for improvements, the Marut retired without being cleared to fire its four 30 mm cannons as the IAF’s attempt to clear this capability in preparation for the 1971 conflict resulted in the loss of a valuable aircraft and its test pilot and had to be abandoned.
In his interview to a daily, reflecting on the adverse impact of the current crisis on the defence budget, the CDS identified the potential threat as being at our borders and against overseas deployments, advising the Services that “we should not go for large amount of imports by misrepresenting our Operational Requirements” adding that “the armed forces push for imports, because they come up with unrealistic staff requirements for weapon systems which the indigenous design and production system cannot deliver”.
In yet another interview he was asked about progress on the pending IAF tender for 114 multi role fighter aircraft (MRFA). In response, the CDS indicated that this had been “replaced by the existing IAF order for an additional 83 LCAs” quoting the IAF Chief as saying, “I would rather take the indigenous fighter, it is good”. Since this was contrary to the IAF’s known position of needing both these platforms, not only was this a reflection on the IAF’s professionalism but must have caused confusion within the Service. Not surprisingly, very soon after, the Air Chief in a more balanced television interview, put the issue in its right perspective.
However, the wider impact of these issues merits reflection. If service headquarters are either unaware of the likely threat assessment, or misrepresenting operational requirements, shorn of niceties, these are reflections on the professionalism on the part of the decision making levels of service headquarters. Indeed in an opinion piece, a retired Lt Gen has written, “The CDS seemed to have publicly reprimanded the Armed Forces for contributing to arms import dependence”.
The CDS wears the twin hats of CDS is and Secretary Department of Military Affairs (DMA). In the former avtaar, he is Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee and bears responsibility for joint planning and operations along with the three service Chiefs. In the latter, he is responsible as part of the Ministry of Defence for, amongst other areas, promoting use of indigenous equipment, along with his other Secretary colleagues of Defence Production and the DRDO.
It is not easy for one person to be bridging the divide that has long existed in our civil-military relations. Nor can one be expected to talk in compartmentalised terms when discussing wide ranging issues concerning defence with the ever inquisitive media. To be fair, one hopes that it was in his capacity as CDS that he was articulating the potential threat for which our armed forces need to plan as this would come under that charter and speaking in his capacity as Secretary DMA on other issues of service requirements and indigenisation. Unfortunately, the forces in the field are not sensitive to the administrative niceties of the rarefied atmosphere at ministries and headquarters in the Capital and the fine distinctions of differing hats that the CDS adorns. How they perceive the slighting of their headquarters and senior leaderships within, by another senior uniformed colleague in public, is a far more delicate issue and deserves to be handled with sensitivity.
Starting with the Kargil Review Committee, followed by other high level ones including the GOM, we have not been able to arrive at a higher defence model that will best suit our national security interests. At one level this indicates the complexity of the subject and at another the sensitive issue of civil-military relations. In our wisdom, we have now chosen a model where the CDS wears two hats, one military and the other civil. The ensuing contradictions will invariably show, as is now the case. The weakness lies in the very management model that we have adopted and irrespective of personalities, will reveal fault lines.
Regrettably, any damage done to the psyche of those in uniform defending our frontiers and to the institution of the armed forces takes a long time to heal and the luxury of experimentation is not one that we can afford in this very sensitive area. It is definitely time to pause and reflect.