“Ugly Duckling, Swan or a Hunt Bird in hand?”

An open source assessment of the JF-17 Thunder by Prof Prodyut Das

The assessment of a rival’s warplane suffers from a primary lacunae in that the information is secret. There is perforce reliance on secondary sources but this is inevitably heavily dosed with rivalry, jealousy, envy, disdain, NIH ( not invented here!) racialism and similar human failings. The task therefore becomes difficult and the output subjective. To illustrate my observation I will mention the case of two very well known warplanes.

The existence of the Mitsubishi Reisen (Zero) first came into US knowledge almost a year before Pearl Harbour. The American Volunteer Group (AVG) Flying Tigers sent back reports from China of an astonishing Japanese fighter with unimaginable maneuverability and range. The US experts discounted these frontline reports because such a fighter could not exist. One can sympathise with the experts. Going by their lights such an aircraft could not be designed. They did not know that the Japanese had got rid of everything which the West would consider “essential”: armour, bullet proof windscreen, self sealing tanks, radios, etc to produce the ultimate dogfighter that swept everything before it.

Flying the Flag! Early model JF-17 shows off the colours

It is an illustration of how human emotions cloud judgment that when the first wrecks were examined after Pearl Harbour much time was spent and much evident satisfaction gained on “identifying” what part of the Zero was copied from which American aircraft! In fact this copy allegation was so sustained that much later, Jiro Hirokoshi, the Zero’s Chief Designer was to say, perhaps with testiness and Japanese style “The Zero was a copy of all the aircraft before it!” Even today there is a persistent view that the Zero had erred by sacrificing protection for performance. This misses an important point. Battle damage resistance would have improved pilot survivality but given the Zero’s phenomenal long range and the fact that it operated over the ocean and over tropical jungles, did Japan have the resources to ensure pilot recovery? Without pilot recovery battle damage resistance is less meaningful. Note that when the fighting was over the homeland, the later versions of the Zero was given a fair measure of battle damage resistance –it was not all Bushido and Banzai as is popularly believed. The real weakness in the Zero was that it had to fight an enemy industrially ten times as big. Putting it in another way, if Japan had the Corsair and the Hellcat and it was the US which had the Zero, the outcome would still be the same. This, by the way, is of avionics and long range missiles were disparaged. Unfortunately, the Vietnam War started in earnest soon after and it was the Americans who had to go back to school - the excellent Red Flag, the F-15 and F-16 being a typical energetic US effort to correct things. The point of citing the above is to accept that assessing a rival’s warplane is difficult not only because of the lack of information but also because of the “schooling”, one has gone through. I sometimes envy the Chinese in that they generally know less English and being “unschooled”, look at things in their own pragmatic Chinese way. With that as both a caution and as disclaiming any infallibility, the following is a very personal assessment of the Sino–Pak JF-17. Enter the (JF-17) Dragon Wikepedia carries a review of the JF-17 Xiaolong ( Fierce Dragon) with several pages of references. The figures cited below are drawn from this review and I will presume that the reader has access to the Net to avoid total repetition. I am therefore confining myself to a commentary. Because both aircraft originated as MiG-21 replacements, comparison with the LCA is inevitable. The Chinese have made so many MiG-21 based derivatives that one can be forgiven for initially thinking it was yet another derivative an argument for maintaining large forces. It pays in the long run.

One would think that things would have improved with time but the MiG-21 case is illustrative. To the Indian Air Force, used to the fit and finish of the Mystere IVA, the MiG-21 was “brute force supersonics” possibly because it was at the time of its induction the most powerful fighter in IAF service. The truth is both the MiG-21 and the Su-7 were the lowest powered aircraft in their categories, though one must add the Soviet aircraft often had no exact equivalent because they were designed for different scenarios. In 1966, an Iraqi MiG-21F-13 defected to Israel and very soon afterwards a leading US Aviation Magazine carried a very detailed examination of the aircraft. Much of the focus was on the poor fit and finish of the aircraft and the mushroom head rivets (discoloured) used in the rear fuselage. The three shock, two position translating cone intake (the mighty EE Lightning had a fixed cone and encountered intake buzz problems during development) and the semi encapsulated SK ejection seat ( surely the best for high altitude supersonic ejection) must have been covered, but the overriding impression one carried away was of gaps and discoloured rivets on the aeronautical equivalent of a combine harvester. Generally, the MiG-21’s lack of the F–104 and F–4 Phantom level of avionics and long range missiles were disparaged. Unfortunately, the Vietnam War started in earnest soon after and it was the Americans who had to go back to school - the excellent Red Flag, the F-15 and F-16 being a typical energetic US effort to correct things.

The point of citing the above is to accept that assessing a rival’s warplane is difficult not only because of the lack of information but also because of the “schooling”, one has gone through. I sometimes envy the Chinese in that they generally know less English and being “unschooled”, look at things in their own pragmatic Chinese way. With that as both a caution and as disclaiming any infallibility, the following is a very personal assessment of the Sino–Pak JF-17.

Enter the (JF-17) Dragon

Wikepedia carries a review of the JF-17 Xiaolong ( Fierce Dragon) with several pages of references. The figures cited below are drawn from this review and I will presume that the reader has access to the Net to avoid total repetition. I am therefore confining myself to a commentary. Because both aircraft originated as MiG-21 replacements, comparison with the LCA is inevitable.

The Chinese have made so many MiG-21 based derivatives that one can be forgiven for initially thinking it was yet another derivative with a nose job like the Qiang JiJi 5, surely one of the ugliest jets I ever wish to see. This impression is quickly corrected by looking at the Table.

4–View Drawing

The JF-17 is no MiG-21 clone. It is altogether a more potent aircraft, reminiscent of the Northrop F-20 Tigershark. Allthough Yang Wei, the Chief Designer, did not have access to the F-20, he may have had opportunity to examine ex-Vietnam Air Force F-5A aircraft or airframes and why not : only an arrogant fool will not “flatter” a good piece of engineering by imitating? Mitchell of Spitfire fame was “inspired” by the Heinkel He-70 Blitz’s graceful lines and Yang Wei may have been similarly “inspired” by Welko Gasich/Lee Begin’s work on the F-5/F-20 series. Northrop of course threw the game away by adding 80 percent more power and 20 percent more weight without changing the wing which remained the same as the F-5 series. The figures of the wing loading speak for themselves. Digressing for a moment, one sees the same reluctance in BAE to design a proper light strike aircraft using perhaps the Hawk systems in a Gnat derived airframe (see Vayu III/2016 ‘Going against the Wind’) instead of trying to fob off native Air Forces with an inappropriate airframe too big for the job.

It would seem that the JF-17’s talented chief designer Yang Wei carefully studied the F-20 concepts and made very well thought out “nips and tucks” type bespoke tailoring of the F-20 design so that the JF-17 did not carry an extra ounce of fat or skin. Comparing the lengths, the JF-17 is 0.53 metres longer but that is largely the difference between the F404 and the RD33 engine lengths. The empty weight of the JF-17 is 622 kgs heavier, but again if you factor in the weight differences of the two engine types and the additional 5.8 sq.mts of wing area that the Sino-Pak fighter carries, the weight is commendable. The weights indicate that either the weight control supervision on the JF-17 was up to US/International design standards or Yang Wei had enough domain expertise to tell the powerful PLAAF faction where they got off regarding equipment fit standards of the JF-17 ! One can recount that whenever the US Navy wanted any additional equipment on the little A-4, Douglas’s Ed Heinmann would reputedly take off fuel of weight equal to the additional equipment requested. Of such stories is aviation lore made. One final point on weights that should make us think: The JF-17 is a larger aircraft with a heavier engine and with an all metal structure and yet it is “as near as dammit” the same weight as the largely composite and smaller Tejas LCA Mk.1. That is an indication of how much we have erred and how much we could correct.

Having accomplished his weight control, Wang Wei pulled off the first of his two coups de main in that the generally conservative approach to the Northrop- like design was modified to a mid wing layout of increased wing area. Despite the weight penalty of longer undercarriage struts and ring frames to carry through the wing bending loads (an additional 42 kilos somehow comes to mind for the frames) it cured several big problems. The F-20 suffered in that though the warload was increased by twenty percent, the low wing meant that fitting the store and the ground clearance certifications must have been nail biting. The mid wing of the JF-17 avoided this easily and the larger wing area meant that the high induced drag of the F-20s in high g turn and the increased CDo caused by the higher AoA, was lowered and dog fighting and general handling improved significantly. The F-20 gave the later F-16s a hard time during fly off competition and the JF-17 should be very much better. One will also note that sweet handling aircraft e.g. Hunter, MiG-21 and the Lightning were mid wing layouts which reduces or eliminates roll coupling and the JF-17 too is a beneficiary.

The second of his coups de main was introduction of the DSI after seven years of parallel preliminary work. DSI reduced weight and drag. Summing up: it would appear that a very competent airframe has been designed on the lines of the Northrop F-20 but as with the F-22/F-31 resemblance, the Chinese design somehow manages to look more elegant and dainty! There has been some gloating references on the Indian Net circles to the fact that Yang Wei has been recently severely criticised for the shortcomings of the J-20 (AMCA team beware!).The gloaters have missed the significant point. Weapons development programmes are of national importance and there is no room for fellowship if things are not delivered. “You fail; you go” is the grim rule for running successful programmes –that is, of course, outside of India.

Programme Management: Hare and Tortoise

The Diagram  shows the difference between timelines of the JF-17 and the LCA. The Sino-Pak team started eight years after India’s and reached where we are today (i.e. a virtual handling flight of some aircraft) ten years ago (nota bene!). To rub the salt in properly, they did it at one third to one fifth the cost calculated at Present Day Value (PDV). The following is my conjecture as to how they did this :

·         They chose an utterly conventional layout. That way they could “decouple” any delay of FBW development.

·         They chose no “glamorous” technology and were almost sanction proof from the word ‘go.’ Being all–metal, the prototypes could be built faster: the shop floor people were dealing with a material they knew from infancy–and also airframes could be modified faster if things did not work out as predicted. Remembering Boeing’s problems with production of the 787’s composites, it is clear that the Chinese, by choosing all metal, could focus entirely on the airframe development without being harassed by how to do it. As they say in the backwoods “if you are up to your ass in alligators it is difficult to remember that what you had actually set out to do is to drain the swamp!”

·         The Chinese chose a pitch–only FBW. This is less “advanced” than a four channel all-axis FBW system. There is a size limit below which FBW becomes “doubtful”. To illustrate: would you fit FBW onto a Cessna 172 club trainer? Theoretically yes but in actuality the FBW weight and complexity would kill the bird. In my view an aircraft like the LCA is just teetering on the brink of this size limit. The “pitch only” FBW is a very good example of an “appropriate engineering” approach. If you think about it, pitch control benefits maximum from FBW in reducing trim drag; roll and yaw have less scope for “improvements” in performance. The Chinese solution is not “brochure glamorous” or exciting but as the inventors of the Panhard-Levassor gearbox said so long ago “C’est brutal mais ce Marche!”: it is rough but it works! As if to add insult to our injury, the Chinese FBW software was written in C++ and not the more elegant ADA language. What makes one pensive is not what they have done but the indication is that the Chinese have reached a stage where they are very respectfully examining what is going on and then instead of being overawed, are doing their own thing. It is this arrogant (and I use it as a compliment!) self confidence that must be noted carefully in assessing any Chinese defence technology product.

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Shorter landings ensured by parachute-braking

 The emphasis is on flying

The Chinese flew the first JF-17 prototype on 25 August 2003 i.e. within four years of funds being sanctioned. They had little faith in that if you calculated enough you would get the thing right first time! Once the third prototype (09/04/2004) was flying they built another three introducing a modified LERX (which needed enlarging) an enlarged inlet (the RD 33 was smoking like a juvenile delinquent!) and the second significant improvement, a diverter-less supersonic intake (DSI) with the first modified prototype flying on 28/04/2006. It must be acknowledged, howsoever grudgingly, that the Chinese/Pakistani team got their fighter in Squadron service in two iterations, six prototypes and within seven years of funding. The alarm bells are ringing here! We are being out developed and the advantage of a big economy is being neutralised by Pakistan through sheer efficiency and better organisation!

The LCA Mk.1 still needs major redesign of about 35-40 per cent before it will be fit for service. I guess that the slow production is a cover to buy time to effect the changes. Those readers who have noted the dramatic cover of Vayu I/2017 with the LCA will have noticed (and disapproved of) the deep boundary layer diverter plates and the bleed off channels (which would have reduced the local lift fields). The Chinese were working on the DSI since 1997 and introduced it in 2004, claiming reduction in weight, cost and drag. Seventeen years after its first flight the LCA fore fuselage and merging of the intake bulges with the centre fuselage still requires considerable refining. It is bemusing to compare with the undershot of the JF-17 (Vayu III/2016 p 94). Similarly if one compares the front views of the two aircraft, the LCA’s excess of re-entrant corners and deep channels indicate excess wetted areas and drags. Out of curiosity I estimated the distance from the rear pressure bulkhead and the tip of the radome for the two aircraft and the JF-17’s figures are 5382 mm compared to the LCA’s 4661 mm. If correct, it indicates the effort and care taken ab initio in getting the forebody drag right. Visually, the cross sections of the LCA’s forebody have a squarer section compared to the JF-17’s and this increased cross section will tell on the transonic drag. Incidentally the JF-17’s radome works out to 690mm compared to 648mm of the LCA, both in the plane of the antennae but the longer nose length compensates.

 The Avionics

 Reading so far one would think it was the Chinese who had done everything but that would be injustice to Pakistan’s contribution. Though clearly the Chinese were in the driver’s seat w.r.t. the airframe, Pakistan played a very competent and independent role in the development of the JF-17 particularly in customising the aircraft for PAF use. Using its better networking and contacts with the West, Pakistan took what amounted to an independent charge of the avionics development for its aircraft, the Chinese going in for their own aggregates which were always on offer to Pakistan. It is noteworthy for example that Pakistan chose a Martin Baker PK 16LE seat over the Chinese model. Though the Chinese had launched the JF-17 project in 1991 Pakistan came on board in 1995 and the funding for the actual aircraft development was signed as a contract in 1999. Hit by sanctions (as with us) the Chinese/Pakistan decided to decouple the avionics development in 1999 and it speaks well of the level of teamwork and the “can do” spirit that both sides were willing to re-engineer the design as and when needed. It will again be noted that choosing an all metal structure for prototypes must have been a great help Today, with its West Asian connections Pakistan or perhaps the PAF is an “owner” of the project and bids fair to do a good job of marketing. They did what we should have done with the PAK/FA. Given our experience with the DARIN mods, clearly the expertise and ability were not lacking, but aims and organisation were. The JF-17 Blocks 1 and 2 equipment fit is more than adequate for the job : HOTAS, MFD/EFIS, Holographic HUD, HUMS, VHF,UHF, ATE. The leading edge and trailing edge flaps are computer controlled to ensure controllability at high AoA. The FBW of production machines has quadruplex FBW in pitch and duplex in roll and yaw. The defensive aids include RWR, MAWS with 3600 scan, chaff flare dispenser and there is provision for a jammer. Block 3 design was finalised in September 2016. The only sardonic cheer for us is having got a decent fit, the PAF is now trying to load it with ‘goodies’ such as IR targeting systems etc. God speed is my wish !

The Russian RD-93 powers the Sino-Pak JF-17

 Propulsion factors

Soviet-origin engines were always derided in the West. One remembers that when HAL was trying to see if the HF-24 could be fitted with the Tyumanskii RD-9F the story (probably untrue) went around that the engine was so surge prone that it would flame out on the test bench if someone so much as coughed at the other end of the Bangalore factory. The actual reason was that the Compressor stress limit was Mach 1.4 and the Soviets point blank (naturally!) refused to redesign it for Mach 2 which was our “must have” specifications at that point of time. Shows how fashions dictate ‘sacred’ specifications and opportunities are lost. I mention the RD-9F case because when the Chinese laid their hands on the RD-9F, they re-engineered the first stage of the compressor, put in a variable angle inlet stator, completely redesigned the hot section and put in a new afterburner stabiliser of reduced losses. It is possible that the variable inlet stator details were inspired by the close examination of the wrecked J.79s available to the Chinese during the Vietnam era. The fact is that the Chinese Wopen 6 of F-6 fighters did not give the PAF any more than the usual problems in service. This tradition of sensible engineering to or improve a base product means that the Taihang WS 13 based on the RD 93 will probably emerge as an acceptable engine though it may not have the 4,000 hr service life demanded of Western engines. Such design targets are dishonest for countries like us. It is much better to design for quick engine change.

 The cost and the prices

 Cost consciousness is important because if there is a significant lowering in the cost of projects, as has happened with the JF-17, it means that there is more money to go around for other projects : bullet proof jackets or Infantry assist vehicles for example. Unchecked spending without results can cause a “drought” which will wither other possible and vital projects. The current asking price for the JF-17 is roughly $25 million which works out to $3800 per kg compared to the $17,000-$21,000 per kg for current Western aircraft. The usual explanation is that these prices are “political/ friendship” prices. This is wrong. One’s own considerable experience in the Industry confirms the following:

The PAF now has four operational JF-17 Squadrons plus a flight with the CCS

The only cost really known for certain is the RM (raw materials) and the BOC (bought out complete) costs. When it comes to labour costs, escalation starts from the shop floor with the supervisor and goes right up the chain though everyone concerned will scream blue murder and horror at the merest suggestion of downwards revisions.

When it comes to overheads it runs riot and again figures are padded up just to be safe. In the absence of competition, this practice is safe but drives up project costs which finally affect local development. In technology transfer, a five-fold reduction in costs is usual. This is not the entire picture. Owing to our colonial past there were rules that were actually designed so that India would NOT develop a local aeronautical capability. Some of these were:

JF-17 in action, purportedly in the north-west frontier region

An import duty structure that allowed complete aircraft to be duty free, accessories had a substantial duty and raw materials were prohibitively taxed. A system of ‘aircraft quality materials’ (AQM) was the norm where the sources of this AQM was invariably from the ‘Home Country.’

These laws – and there were many – may or may not have been repealed but the spirit lives on and the bureaucracy with nothing to gain and not tamed by the national leadership, staunchly obstructs any attempt to reform. One will hear many arguments for maintaining status quo but there has been little reasoned debate as was done in China and Russia who do not have this anachronism. Finally with PSUs operating at a cost plus 15 percent basis and western weapons suppliers with a stock of horror stories if any initiative is inimical to their interests, it is us who have been “schooled” into believing what should be the price of warplanes. The Sino-Pak prices are realistic and have scope for further reduction.

The PAF now has four operational JF-17 Squadrons plus a flight with the CCS

An estimate of performance

Readers are referred to Vayu I/2015 in which I had said that the LCA Mk.1 would not be able to outperform the JF-17 as a fighter. It can be used as a strike aircraft but the outcome of any dogfight would be in favour of the JF-17. I have not seen anything in the past two years that needs me to make a drastic revision of that view. The only parameter the LCA Mk1 potentially is superior to the JF-17 is in TO performance The JF-17 will need a 25% longer run but even that difference will be reduced as this is not corrected for the CDo and the reported lower engine installation efficiency for the LCA. Readers may raise the point that an aircraft with a sprightlier take off should perform better but this is not so because at combat speeds the CDo drag of the LCA will be much higher. Incidentally I did compare the TO values for the LCA and the Harrier and assuming equally efficient intake design and CDos. The LCA should be marginally better/similar to the Harrier in the STO mode. If the Navy’s disappointment is purely technical, then the weight and drag problem in the LCA is still significant.

What perhaps HAL should do is to take a deep breath and clean up the entire fore fuselage with particular attention to the blending of the front fuselage with the mid fuselage. The clutter is visible from afar and must be worse in detail! If ADA is ready with the DSI (only if!) it should be brought forward. They should do it in metal to begin with so as to get the prototype right quickly rather than have a nice sub project of making it in composites. With the clean up and the weight reduced the LCA stands a very good chance but not as things stand at the moment. C’ne marche pas! The LCA is unlikely to be cleared for serious series production until 2019-2020 – if that !

Like the LCA, the JF-17 was a MiG-21 replacement but it is now something more – nearer to a F-16 supplement at one fifth/one sixth the price and no threats of being sanctioned in which the PAF has much experience. It has potential to become “fashionable” i.e. over equipped. What the JF-17 lacks it does not need and Pakistan should leave the aircraft well enough alone. In summing up,

•          The LCA has the potential to have significantly better field performance even at the current empty weight of 6650kg.
•  In low level OAS the small size and the 5 percent better fuel fraction (internal fuel/ installed cold thrust) the LCA may be a better choice.
  
•  In any close combat as of the present the LCA is inferior. (See Vayu I/2015)
  
• Owing to more power and a bigger (by about 52 mm) antennae the JF-17 is the better BVR platform but I think it is stupid to fit BVRs simply and just because they can be fitted on an aircraft of this size. BVR capability is a specialised capability which ruins general capabilities to install. 
• The current availability (raw figures) of the JF-17 is 113hrs/aircraft/year as of 2016. There has been two accidents in 19,000 hrs which is close to the 1 per 10,000 hrs for ‘bedded down’ equipment and indicates reliability. Production is now of the Block 2 and about 90 airframes are delivered or are on the slipway.
•  At this point of time, the JF-17 is the better aircraft and the LCA is not even achieving its potential in the areas where it has the potential to be better. Sadly the comparisons are academic.
• At this point, the PAF can fly 200-250 OAS sorties per day with the JF-17. The LCA … ?

And as for Exports

Any Asian product is bad mouthed. The twelve Hindustan HT-2s supplied to Ghana were routinely disparaged by the foreign instructors seconded to the GAF. The sturdiness, low prices and the fact that they served the IAF for over thirty years “faults and all” was overlooked. The more recent case of the ALH could be reference. This is to be expected. The Chinese are in a better position. Over the years they have exported fair numbers to European, African and Asian customers and have acquired useful skills in marketing, selling and sustaining a product on the field. The JF-17 has attracted the attention of about 21 customers with Myanmar, Nigeria and Saudi Arabia as confirmed operators. The weak link was the RD33/93 engine being of Russian origin but if the Russians refuse the engine because of fears of the JF-17 cannibalising MiG-29 sales, they have little choice because the Chinese will develop the WS13 Taihang. Even if the TBOs are not quite upto the “international standards” their prices will be extremely attractive and international standards are not an operational necessity. I would not have minded buying the JF-17 myself for the IAF! The Chinese have exported over two thousand aircraft and the JF-17 bids fair to add to those numbers and customers list.

PAF JF-17 Thunder at a Zhuhai Air Show in China

The reason why

The JF-17 is either an unremarkable warplane or a coolly brilliant piece of engineering improvisation superbly managed. The judgment will depend on one’s ‘schooling’ but what cannot be denied is that the Sino Pak team has already raised five squadrons on the type. There is an old adage “An engineer is a person who can do for sixpence which any fool can do for six shillings”. The JF-17 demonstrates that the LCA’s so called “technical superiority” has been its undoing and if we confine ourselves up to correct the technical shortcomings of the LCA Mk.1 then we shall be setting ourselves up to fail with the AMCA. The present situation is bleak and near collapse. I do not see any evidence of the energy and the interested management that is the vital need of the hour. The organisation for effective development is not the present topic but that is the crux. What the Sino/Pak team achieved with the JF-17 they can do in AFVs and submarines and rifles and every item required in warfare. We shall be out resourced and out timed – and out gunned! India’s weapons development programmes are in the “fire and forget” mode which will not work in a hundred years. By preoccupation with other “priorities”, the politicians, the bureaucracy and the armed forces have abdicated their role of leadership in weapons development to the technocrats.. None of the above, singly, can manage weapons anymore than the blind men could “see” the elephant. Yet the solution lies in them working as a team with respect for the undoubted competence that there is in each organisation. Unthinkable in our bureaucracy–dominated committees, Pakistan had serving Air Marshals in charge of the JF-17 project who reported directly to the Air Chief whereas we had the IAF actually “shorted out” so that the LCA project could be “fast tracked”! The cheek of this ! So left to themselves the technical people went on a technical picnic !

India’s LCA

The Armed Forces responses have been studied and are clumsy rather than moral (why did they accept pressure when things were obviously out of control and so much was at stake?) Recall Air Marshal Dowding’s stand just before the Battle of Britain: he stood up to that old steamroller Churchill (of course he paid the price!)The bureaucracy’s sniping of the military must stop forth with! This tribal warfare between the bureaucracy and the forces has to be tamed and yoked by the political leadership. The country must form a WEDOG (weapons development group) so that realistic threat scenarios are generated for ‘say’ the next ten years in that we need to become sanctions independent. China used its large armed forces and its nuclear deterrent to buy the vital ten years it needed. Given our large armed forces and our nuclear capability, we have those ten years. We have the expertise to do sobut only if we work in a team. Realistic threat identification will lead to realistic specifications. Realistic specifications will reduce technical challenges and prioritise weapons programmes. Close monitoring will stop the shocking wastage and ensure timeliness. We may yet surprise the world!

Table 1

·         Pakistan has an excellent replacement for the F-7

·         The LCA’s 10% higher disposable load should be noticed. With drag reduction and weight improvement it should be quite respectable but there is no evidence of any timely addressing of these long pending tasks.

Table 2: LCA Costs ( Rs. Crore unless otherwise stated) and PDV (present day value)

Note: The above does not include Rs 1729 sanctioned by the Navy ( 2003) for the NLCA PDV ( Rs. 6512 crores). This excludes Rs. 4353 (2432+1921) PDV Rs. 9331 crores sanctioned for LCA Mk2. If we further ignore the Rs 560 crores sanctioned in 1983 the comparison of costs on the common base of PDV is:

LCA ( 16512+15172+5305)= 36,989

JF-17 ( 13,065)= 13065

Financially we are being ‘ resourced” by at least at a rate of 2.83 :1. Readers will be interested to compare that the entire XST/F-117 stealth development programme was funded in 1973-1978 to the tune of 4997 crores PDV in small stages to produce the required cutting edge technology aircraft. Unless financial management is tightened we will not have funds for local development. [all in Rs. crore]