Six fighter types of the Indian Air Force on parade
The IAF is often blamed for not participating whole heartedly in joint operations and (supporting) indigenisation. As regards Joint Operations, one has to commence with a historical perspective.
Operations in 1948, 1962, 1965, 1971
During the 1948 Kashmir Operations, there were limitations tions imposed on the use of air power by a higher political directive immediately after independence, and this is not to be misconstrued as lack of jointness. Offensive air action was limited owing to restrictions imposed by (the then Governor General) Lord Louis Mountbatten and senior British officers, lest the war between the two new nations escalate.
In the 1948 Kashmir Operations (the RIAF’s) Nos. 7, 8, 10 & 12 Squadrons participated. The Operations were limited to direct support of troops and there was no air interdiction outside own artillery range. There was no interdiction of (vital) bridges (Kohala for example) and thus the Army did not count much on the IAF’s support.
During the 1962 Indo-China War, the IAF was not inducted into the conflict due to fear of escalation, as there was no defence against retaliatory action by the Chinese. The IAF was only employed to carry out supplies to forward posts in Ladakh and NEFA. Helicopters were employed in the air maintenance role. Transport aircraft were used in improving reinforcement of troops and to fly AMX-13 tanks to Chushul.
In 1965, the Army and the IAF fought their own wars, with the latter pitching in when called upon. In fact, Akhnoor was saved due to the lightning response to a call for close air support to stop the attacking Pak armour, which was carried out with aplomb by the IAF fighters. The IAF flew about 1400 of a total 3927 sorties in the west for offensive air support to the army. Of these, only 482 sorties were planned at the JAAOC level.
Air Chief Marshal PC Lal later observed: “Having had some responsibility for all this, I must confess that the air war became a somewhat hit-and-miss affair that depended heavily on finding targets of opportunity for its success.”
On the other hand, Lt General Harbaksh Singh (then GOC-in-C Western Command) mentioned in his ‘War Dispatches’ that joint organisations did not work properly because “professionally ‘Below Standard’ army officers manned GLO Type ‘B’ & ‘C’s and out of the authorised total of 43 Ground Liaison Officers, the army had only 12”.
He further stated that “Having suffered a rebuff in the Khem Karan Sector, the enemy’s ace 1st Armoured Division with Patton tanks was able to transfer, by railways, two Regiments of tanks through the plains of Lahore without any interference from our Air Force. They inducted these in the Sialkot Sector. “This was because we had not carried out a joint appreciation on the enemy’s course of action”.
Again, as observed by Air Chief Marshal PC Lal, in 1965 “On the Army’s side the notion persisted that it would fight on its own, with the Air Force providing only an occasional bonus: and in the Air Force (where I was the Vice Chief), we thought of fighting mainly an air war against the PAF and what we considered to be strategic targets, assigning relatively low priority on support to the Army. Separate plans were hastily drawn up by each service with no joint consultation worth the name and again no tasks were envisaged for the Navy”.
Long reach of the IAF is augmented by mid-air refueling such as seen here with Il-78MKI and Jaguar strike fighters
Jointness
To correct our deficiencies in jointness, by 1971 the IAF had realigned its geographical boundaries with Army Commands : Western Commands of the Army and the Air Force and South Western Commands of the Army and the Air Force were similar in geographies. Directorate of Joint Operations was formed at Air Headquarters headed by an Air Commodore. Advance Headquarters were co-located with Army Commands. TAC were formed alongside Corps HQ and FACs were placed along with Battalion Headquarters. Similar organisations called MAO and MEAF were placed alongside Naval formations. The 1971 war was won not individually but jointly. Some spectacular demonstrations of jointness were seen in the Tangail paradrop, heli-bridging in East Pakistan (Sylhet) and large percentage of CSFO missions on both fronts.
Kargil 1999
The Kargil War in 1999 was a surprise with the Army not realising that it was not a handful of terrorists, but a sizeable portion of Pak Infantry and Artillery which was executing the plan. This was in spite of aerial photographs taken by the ARC that located six Pakistani military helicopters on our side of the LoC on 17 May. The analysis failed to reach Army Headquarters until 19 May with the IAF not being in the picture. In a cabinet level meeting on 18 May, the then Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh was instrumental in denying permission to use Air Power in the conflict for fear of escalation.
Upgraded Mirage 2000(TI)
But a more important factor needs understanding when using Air Power in view of its potential consequences. All armed conflicts contain elements and processes of escalation – the first artillery shell fired is an escalation, and so is the use of tanks, etc. Use of combat air power is not any different. The critical factor is that when we escalate the level of war, or the employment of components of military power, the type of weapons and so on, we must carefully assess the implications and likely responses of the enemy. It would be reasonable to accept that the enemy would also try to escalate, at least to similar levels if not more than that, if it can, to cope with the higher level of violence and/or changed nature of conflict and its effect. An ability to deal with the situation where own advantage is maintained or even maximised further is the critical factor in ensuring escalation dominance. Thus, the CAS would have been less than responsible if he had not catered for a possible/ probable response by Pakistan to the use of IAF combat power. After all, Pakistan having completely mobilised by 14 May and being fully deployed in 48 hrs (as per Air Commodore Kaiser Tufail) could have launched its aggression. Its possible choices in response to IAF combat operations would have been to use its own combat air against Indian Army targets in J&K, or expand the conflict to attacking IAF bases in J&K, and beyond that to those in the rest of India. We obviously then would have slid into a fullscale war (as per Air Commodore Jasjit Singh).
Some significant issues related to such an eventuality deserve our attention. One of them is the generation of a great deal of heat, though not much light, regarding the issue of the Air Force stressing that political authorisation must be obtained before combat air power is used in conflict. Many people have interpreted this as a failure of ‘jointness’ and others have used this controversy to justify the creation of theatre commands.
It is in the context of escalation, that the Air Force requires notice to place its formations on alert, moving forces wherever required. But the sheer act of placing the Air Force on operational alert also has major domestic and international political implications and this makes it necessary for the political leaders to authorise it. In an emergency, of course, the Air Force can react quickly, and the then Air Chief had ffered to commence combat air operation in as little as six hours.
Attack Helicopters
But what was the Army demanding ? They wanted attack helicopters (Mi-35). These attack helicopters could not operate at these altitudes because they were not designed for it. They also wanted armed helicopters (Mi-17s with unguided rockets) to assist in throwing back what was believed to be infiltration by militants. But helicopters, especially those using unguided rockets, are extremely vulnerable to modern ground fire since they need to come to less than 1000 metres range abort their mission in the 2003 Iraq War (at Kabala) as a consequence of such strikes. The IAF requested for clearance from the Government for use of combat air power in close proximity to the borders, and suggested that fixed wing assets were more suitable given the nature of the terrain and expected opposition.
To quote Air Marshal Narayan Menon in his book ‘Kargil–10 Years After’, these were incorrectly brushed aside as ‘non-cooperation’ or ‘lack of jointness’ by Army officers. Helicopters in the high mountains are even more vulnerable since the resonance of their rotor blades give their location away many minutes before they are anywhere near their targets.
Involving combat Air Power thus demands decision-making by the political executive on the advice of the military at every step. At the CCS meeting on 24-25 May 1999, the then Prime Minister, while authorising combat Air Power, had designated 26 May as the date for the IAF to commence operations.
Professional approach
The intention is not to boast of our capabilities, but we entered the conflict in a professional manner. As the situation started to deteriorate during the middle of May, the IAF began reconnaissance and surveillance flights and also training for the unique conditions in which it would have to fight once the government gave the green signal. Innovation and out-of-box thinking were the need of the hour. For the first time MiG-21s carried out GPS-assisted bombing at night over mountainous terrain and the newly procured Litening pods meant for Jaguars were operationalised on the Mirage 2000 as the integration time was comparatively less.
IAF C-130J Super Hercules demonstrates rough-field abilities (photo: Angad Singh)
To quote General VP Malik, the then COAS, Air Land Ops was the thrust area during Kargil. He paid the highest compliment in his book to the Indian Air Force when he concluded that the IAF influenced the war at the strategic level. He affirms: “As the magnitude of the intrusion became clear, it became necessary to employ air power for various purposes: to support ground operations; to carry out reconnaissance to interdict enemy supply routes and logistics bases; to destroy enemy footholds; and most importantly, to establish strategic and tactical superiority over the enemy”.
Command Structures
However, post these wars, the Indian Army found the necessity of increasing its Command (structure) with Western Command being divided into Northern and Western and South Western into South Western and Southern. To ensure integration, the IAF created additional advance HQs with the newly formed Commands but maintained its own Operational Commands to ensure centralised planning and decentralised execution. Today, we have Advance Headquarters at all Operational Army Commands and TACs at all Corps Headquarters. In addition, we also have hundreds of FACs to be mobilised, should hostilities break out.
The IAF’s ‘big stick’ : HAL-built Su-30MKI with Ilyushin Il-78MKI
Dedicated for maritime strike are modified Jaguars and Su-30MKIs
The IAF yojna is prepared for a two year period jointly with both the Army and Navy. Today, we have two squadrons of fighters modified and dedicated for maritime role, more than 100 aircraft dedicated for CSFO with others also directly or indirectly for Air Land Operations : the most expensive Special Weapons such as Harpoon antiship and SFW for anti-ship and anti armour roles. At Air Force, Army and Naval Headquarters (ACAS level), we have the Joint Operations Committee Meetings (JOCOM) which integrates us and provides higher directions for joint operational plans. To execute joint operations at the Andaman & Nicobar Command (ANC), a theatre command has been formed with appropriate contribution by the IAF as the deployed forces are too far from the mainland to be able to assist operations against Pakistan or China.
We today have voice communication between the Services. Data connectivity will be available once DCN operationalises and a more seamless communication will be available once the Army’s and Navy’s integral networks stabilise.
Jaguar Maritimes lineup for formation take off
Indigenisation
As regards indigenisation, it needs reiteration that you can walk without technology, you can sail or swim with some technology, but you cannot fly without technology. If a vehicle or a ship comes to a halt you can get out of it and tow it. From an aircraft either you eject with a total loss of a machine – or die.
The standards set for aerospace are therefore, exacting. Secondly, do we have the luxury of time? Brazil signed a contract for 36 new generation Gripen aircraft in September 2015 for deliveries starting in 2019. The bottom line is they have no enemies, there is no inordinate hurry; so development can take its time, whereas we have two nuclear-armed neighbours with whom we have fought wars.
In a situation wherein you enjoy tremendous asymmetry and are able to project power anywhere in the region, should you get delayed, the adversary is not in a position to threaten you. Then, once again, we have the luxury of time. So what are the options for us with two nuclear armed adversaries?
If there are going to be no wars, we can wait for the indigenous solution to come in its time, or we start replacing low end weapons first with indigenously developed ones, while we import the best to defeat the enemy. That is exactly what we have followed in all fields.
As (examples) in the acquisition of radars, we got the indigenous Rohini to replace the P-18s radars, the indigenous Arudhra to complement our medium power radars and finally we will get the mountain radars and the long range surveillance radars. In weapons, we started with 1000 lbs bombs, then indigenously manufactured 250/450 kg high speed bombs; now we are testing the indigenous anti tank missiles i.e Helina, the Astra airto-air missiles and Gautam and Gaurav laser guided bombs.
HAL’s HTT-40 turboprop trainer is being offered to the IAF for basic flying training (photo: Angad Singh)
As for indigenious-developed aircraft, earlier we had the HF-24, now the Tejas LCA and in the future the AMCA. As for surface-to-air missiles, there is the Akash, now MRSAM in collaboration with Israel and finally the LRSAM. In helicopters, from licence manufacture of Cheetah/Chetak, now Dhruv ALH, and in future the LCH and LUH.
Thus, in every field we have a road map for indigenisation. But when we ask for top of the line weapons for the high end fight, we are often accused as being against indigenous platforms or weapons.
HAL’s light combat helicopter (LCH) is now cleared for productionisation
Some people say we should get indigenous platforms in large numbers, quoting Stalin who said “quantity has a quality of its own”. One has to remember that, firstly, in air combat the asymmetry is quite stark. In 1982 Lebanon conflict, the ratio of losses was 85:2 in favour of the Israelis : can we afford a victory that may turn out to be Pyrrhic? What ails our indigenous drive is the quality control in manufacturing, which has shown an improvement over the years but we (still) have miles to go.
It is stressed that the IAF does not pay only lip service to indigenisation. We have paid with the lives of our test pilots and engineers. Since independence, 17 pilots and engineers have died in air accidents during testing and evaluation of the indigenous Marut, Kiran, Ajeet, Saras and AWACS prototype aircraft.
IAF is committed to both joint operations and indigenisation. All future conventional wars are invariably decided in the air. If you lose the air battle, there is no way you can succeed on the ground or over the sea against a conventional enemy. Air is one dimension that extends over both land and sea. Rome built roads to become a land power and subsequently Britannia ruled the waves through its sea power. But post the Second World War, the pre-eminence of air power against a conventional enemy has been firmly established.
The Dassault Rafale will give the IAF a tremendous boost in operational capability
The problem lies in the fact that both land and naval forces need air power to achieve their military objectives. The Air Force does not require direct support of either of the two services. The IAF is a multi-sector force and new aircraft like the Rafale are omni-role in their capability. You cannot tie this down to any one sector, unless you are limited by geography, wherein assets in a geographical area cannot be applied in another akin to the US theatre commands.
The IAF fights to achieve the stated military objectives. In 1971, the objective was to liberate Bangladesh; so once the requisite air superiority was achieved, all sorties were flown towards close air support. Even air defence missions were stopped. In Kargil, the objective was to recapture posts occupied by the enemy; so again, most missions were battlefield air strikes.
The Tejas light combat aircraft has just entered service with the IAF
The IAF fights to achieve the stated military objectives. In 1971, the objective was to liberate Bangladesh; so once the requisite air superiority was achieved, all sorties were flown towards close air support. Even air defence missions were stopped. In Kargil, the objective was to recapture posts occupied by the enemy; so again, most missions were battlefield air strikes.
No nation can afford to become a great power without having indigenous capability. The IAF fully supports it, but this has to be a step-by-step approach and critical items required have to be imported, if need be. The Government’s push towards defence manufacturing in the private sector is a welcome step. This will compete with the public sector like it happened in telecom and create an eco system for manufacturing in the aerospace sector – the kind of fillip the automobile industry got with advent of the Maruti car.
*Adapted from the ‘Air Chief Marshal LM Katre Memorial Lecture’ delivered by Air Chief Marshal BS Dhanoa, Chief of the Air Staff on 9 September 2017 at Bangalore.