Air Marshal Harish Masand queries that there are
More Questions than Answers
An analysis of the much-reported air combat between the IAF and PAF on 27 February as a fall-out of the Balakot strike the previous morning, has thrown up a number of theories, conjectures and scenarios particularly with regard to the brief but sharp dogfight between an F-16 against a vintage although upgraded, MiG-21 Bison. Claims and counter-claims have flown thick and fast, perhaps as thick and fast as a modern day aerial engagement between high-speed jets in some numbers.
Very little has been confirmed by the officials concerned on both sides, except for the claim of an F-16 shot down by the IAF as per India’s Defence Minister, Ms Sitharaman at a Conclave on 12 March. From the Pakistan side, Prime Minister Imran Khan initially claimed two Indian aircraft as shot down, with two pilots in their captivity. Shortly this turned out to be just one aircraft and one pilot, the newest “hero” of India, Wing Commander Abhinadan Varthaman whose capture and interrogation were soon flashed on social media and TV.
Thereafter, no further information emerged from Pakistan on its claim of the second IAF aircraft and the mysterious second pilot. However, just as I was writing this, I received pictures of some damaged but unfired missiles reportedly carried on Abhinandan’s aircraft, as put out by Pakistani sources. From the Indian side, little has been in public domain, except for the early display of an AIM-120C-S AMRAAM which can only be fired from the F-16, thus confirming the use of this type in this engagement but little to confirm any downing of any F-16.
PAF F-16 of No.9 Squadron (‘Griffins’)
Finance Minister Arun Jaitley reiterated the claim and chase of the F-16 some days later in an interview on CNN News 18 and supported this with the story about a retired PAF Air Marshal’s son being that F-16 pilot, something earlier negated on social media. However, Mr Jaitley, rightly commented on the issue of “space-filler” information versus “scientific evidence” while stating that “our intelligence and imagery cannot be put out in public domain for obvious reasons”. However, in my opinion, that should not prevent us from going ahead to confirm such an important claim with some hard facts which do not compromise national security.
To be sure, this was the first such air combat between the two air forces since the 1971 war, over 47 years earlier. Thus, this engagement was bound to generate much interest and comment worldwide, to push home pet theories, glorify one side or denounce the other but very few to genuinely derive some important lessons. The first western report on 3 March had raised doubts on the efficacy of India’s vintage fighters, perhaps erroneously criticising the use of MiG-21s in this encounter (www.nytimes) while a later one by Joseph Trevithick actually rubbished claims of the MiG-21 Bison shooting down the Pakistani F-16, in some pretty strong language. However, the latter article then reluctantly listed some capabilities of the upgraded MiG-21, the Bison, and summarised its 4th generation capabilities in avionics and weapons after the upgrade, including the R-77 BVR & R-73 close combat missiles, the helmet mounted sight and, most importantly, in the modern air battle with both sides having a BVR capability, the carriage of self-protection electronic warfare systems in this case the Israeli ELTA 8222. Such capabilities give the MiG-21 Bison the ability to take on more modern aircraft including the F-15 Eagle, as demonstrated during various Cope India exercises with the USAF, particularly when operated in a numerically stronger package with some support from more advanced aircraft like the Su-30, Mirage2000 and MiG-29s in the IAF’s inventory.
Large numbers of the Sukhoi Su-30MKI equip the Indian Air Force, this ‘air dominance’ fighter having long range capability and carrying several BVR air-to-air missiles including the Vympel NPO R-77 missile (export designation RVV-AE) missile seen above and being launched at a fire power display (below).
However, while admitting such capabilities of the MiG-21 Bison, the writer does question the absence of hard facts supporting our claim of the F-16. Certainly, this was not a one-on-one fight between the two aircraft so the question is not about which aircraft is superior but which air force used its resources in more effective manner.
Be that as it may, the loss of one of our MiG-21 Bison in this encounter raises certain questions. Quite obviously, even reasonably knowledgeable outsiders cannot answer these questions without full information on the manner in which this air combat took place. Again, very obviously, we should not even expect such full information from either of the air forces. However, it is hoped that these issues or questions have been being addressed by the IAF in order to draw the right lessons for the future.
220 MiG-21bis (Type 75) were received by the IAF, bulk of which were produced by HAL at Nasik, the last being delivered in March 1987. 125 of these were extensively upgraded to the ‘bison’ standard, with first flight taking place in 2000 and subsequently equipping six fighter squadrons of the IAF.
Having carried out the pre-emptive strike at Balakot predawn on 26 February (see Vayu Issue II/2019) it must be assumed that the IAF was fully prepared for any retaliatory action by the PAF. Thereafter, the first question obviously is whether we used adequate numbers of MiG-21 Bisons with a mix of the other more modern 4th generation fighters like the Su-30MKI and MiG-29 to ensure requisite numerical and qualitative superiority on the intruding force to not just deter but shoot down maximum number of enemy aircraft. Just imagine the situation thereon if we had paraded 8 or more Pakistani pilots in our captivity as against one of ours ! Some reports suggest that while the Pakistanis had a posse of between 18-24 fighters (of various types), we launched just 6 MiG-21s with some 4 Su-30s on air dominance patrol. Surely with our air defence systems on full alert, we could have launched a far larger number of fighters to overwhelm the intruders.
Since an AMRAAM BVR missile reportedly shot down the MiG-21 fired from an F-16, the second question arises on whether Wing Commander Abhinandan’s aircraft was carrying the ELTA EW pod to thwart such a missile attack. If indeed it did carry such a pod, did the pod fail to function or is it inadequate to counter the threats of today? A capable EW and counter-measure systems are absolutely critical elements for a fighter aircraft in air engagement in today’s environment. But a related issue concerns the limited number of hard points on the MiG-21 which carry fuel, weapons or other stores such as this EW pod. An internal EW system, therefore, would have made eminent sense so as to release external hard points for extra fuel or various ordnance. As Director of the MiG-21 Bis Upgrade project till contract signing in 1996, I had continuously tried for such an internal EW system but for reasons beyond my control, the IAF settled for an external EW pod which lost the IAF a precious external station (or 25% of the capacity). However, that is another story for another time. Nevertheless, it does need to be emphasised that if we had an internal EW system on the Bison, even the possibility of the pod not being carried in this engagement would not have arisen.
IAF MiG-21bison with both RVV-AE and R-73 missiles seen under wing
Another issue worth consideration introspectively is on the relative positioning and presence of other aircraft in this interceptor group. Where were other formation members when Wing Commander Abhinandan was engaging or chasing the F-16 and what did they do and observe? Surely, the transmission calls between them and from/to the situation controller would substantiate our claim of downing the F-16 ? Also, if the MiG-21 was shot down immediately after the F-16, surely the F-16 wreckage should also be close to where the MiG-21 came down to earth, just a few kilometers across the LoC. If that be so, why is it that we have not been able to acquire the imagery of that crash site? Also, why did Abhinandan not launch the longer range R-77 BVR missile instead of choosing to chase the F-16 for an R-73 CCM launch, as has been reported. It is emphasised that training in the IAF teaches us that a good fighter pilot never leaves a formation member behind and even stays with the downed teammate till he is rescued, fuel and other conditions permitting. So, did Abhinandan’s other formation members not stay with him, at least till his MiG-21 was shot at and could they not have collectively threatened the attacking aircraft?
Certainly, the IAF must have closely analysed these issues based on the facts known only to them but hopefully someday, one will hear the whole story, even in a box-office movie, without politicisation of this entire episode !