Representative picture of IAF Mirage 2000 releasing free fall bombs
12 days after the terror attack on Indian security forces at Pulwama in the Kashmir Valley on 14 February 2019, the Indian Government decided that enough was enough and responded with air strikes on key J-e-M terrorist camps reportedly located at Jaba Top near Balakot in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, in “mainland Pakistan” itself. What was significant about these strikes was not the body count nor confirmation on the number of terrorists actually eliminated but that, for the first time, Indian forces had not only crossed the LoC but also went into Pakistan itself for carrying out this particular strike. Even during Kargil 1999, where clear aggression by the Pakistani military had been established India had fought with one hand tied behind its back with the Lakshman Rekha regarded as the LoC in Kashmir. There can be little debate on the argument that if then the LoC was not kept sacrosanct and the armed forces given the liberty of attacking from the flanks or rear through an indirect approach, the casualties, both on ground and in the air, would have been substantially less and the Army would have evicted the intruders from occupied posts earlier than was done.
From the internet
Viewed in this context, along with the minor incursions across the LoC in past retaliatory actions, true significance of the Balakot strike is the message this nation has sent through its Air Force in that it is capable and determined to strike at terror bases wherever they may be. Fortunately, there were no reported IAF losses in these pre-dawn strikes of 26 February. The Pakistanis did not claim interception of any IAF aircraft that took part in these raids. However, even if there had been some losses, these would – and should – have been acceptable to the nation considering importance of the message sent out not just to Pakistan but also the international community of India’s resolve to combat terror and the manner of retaliation.
There was meticulous planning and execution of operations by the Indian Air Force, making the nation proud. I will not go into guesswork or try to focus on which aircraft types took part in these strikes nor where they took off from on how they conducted the planned strike, as some others found important to discuss and debate on TV channels for days thereafter. Personally, I want to commend the IAF for being reticent on details since these are not for public consumption, no matter how much the temptation to get some limelight. After all, even the minutest information on plans can adversely affect future operations of such nature. In that context, for some to claim credit in having planned such strikes a decade or more ago was also perhaps unnecessary.
As a matter of fact, I would be disappointed if current leadership of the IAF had just dusted and used such dated plans since with acquisition of new technology, knowledge, expertise as well current intelligence, operational plans must inevitably change and be innovative to surprise the enemy every time. Neither the IAF nor the foreign secretary, who made the official announcement in the forenoon of 26 February, mentioned which aircraft, how many or from where, as also the weapons were used and the exact or even the estimated casualties inflicted. I have not been able to figure out where our media picked up details on the Mirages, Mid-Air Refuellers and AWACS and so on.
The Indian Air Force has three squadrons of Mirage 2000s, currently being upgraded by Dassault/HAL.
Despite such clear restraint on part of the officials concerned, it is disturbing to witness some persons making claims on the numbers killed while others are asking for evidence of the strikes or even the exact number of casualties. Such detractors, whatever their compulsions, do not seem to understand the main objective of the strikes or the fact that in air actions, the number of casualties cannot be estimated with any degree of accuracy without having persons on ground immediately thereafter, particularly when the adversary is in a denial mode and all damage would be cleared or covered post-haste. All that can be done is to project the numbers likely to have been in the target complex based on latest intelligence. Also, it would be incorrect to even ask the Air Force to put out in public domain any imagery from the strike aircraft or its other assets.
In counter intelligence, even such imagery gives away the type of assets used and attack pattern employed, the resolution of the imagery and many other aspects can be used to deduce capabilities and likely future employment of assets. In any event, such evidence on the strike having been successfully carried out has slowly emerged from unofficial sources. Pakistan itself admitted the intrusion with some outrage, with an audio of J-e-M warning of rebirth of Jehad, while an Italian journalist, Francesca Marino, wrote of extensive damage with eyewitness accounts of 40-50 killed and another 35-40 wounded. Later, YouTube posted a video giving satellite imagery of the terrorist complex at Balakot before – and after – the strike. More details would surely emerge with the passage of time. Even the IAF may eventually put out some evidence once these phase of operations are over and when the information is not considered sensitive.
Signboard of the Madrasa Taleem al-Quran, run by Maulana Masood Azharat near Balakot.
In the meantime, the political storm being created for evidence, without patience, may result in confusion, even demoralising the warfighters. One can be certain that senior leadership in the armed forces are taking suitable steps to ensure that attention of the fighting elements is not distracted by such political controversies, an unnecessary and wasteful drain on time and resources.
Immediately after the strikes, while the nation was waking up, one can be certain that the armed forces remained in high state of alert for possible retaliatory action from the other side. Thus, air intrusions by PAF aircraft the very next day should not have surprised anyone, least of all the Indian Air Force. Without detracting from Wing Commander Abhinandan’s bravery, and his later conduct in captivity which we all salute, it is surprising that the Air Force decided to pit MiG-21s, perhaps mixed with some Su-30s, against incoming F-16s. I was in charge of the MiG-21 upgrade to Bison standards from initial evaluation of proposals in 1993 till after contract conclusion in 1996 so I know exactly what the Bison is capable of in terms of its combat capability, including avionics and weaponry. The MiG-21 Bison has performed admirably against later generation aircraft in various international exercises in which they took part. However, the airframe and power plant of the Bison remains almost the same as earlier variants limiting its maneuverability and close combat capabilities against more modern aircraft such as the F-16. It was known that the Bison would not be able to hold its own against superior aircraft types except when in a large and coordinated group where numbers overcome limitation in individual maneuverability.
An edit piece in the NY Times is already questioning the IAF’s vintage hardware and inability to face future challenges as a strategic partner of the USA. I am also hoping that the Indian Air Force will to get some imagery of the F-16 crash site, reportedly just across the LOC before it was cleaned up, through various means available to it, instead of some tidbids on TV about a drop tank here and engine casing there being examined by Pakistan soldiers. Despite the reportedly heartening performance of this old work-horse against an F-16 as reported elsewhere [“Fishbed vs Falcon : Why the ancient MiG-21s F-16 kills no fluke”] the claim would someday need to be substantiated by more than just conjectures. It would certainly strengthen our case on “misuse” of the F-16 which reportedly is against US laws and conditions of sale.
Finally, I also hope the IAF has post-analysed this engagement and examine why more of the intruding force, if not all, were engaged in this very first aerial faceoff between the two air forces after almost five decades. That would have sent a powerful message to Pakistan – and we certainly have the assets to be able to do this.
Air Marshal (retd.) Harish Masand VrC