Former CAS, Air Chief Marshal NAK Browne on the Fifty Shades of Balakot
The tragic loss of 40 CRPF lives on 14 February in the Pulwama suicide bombing attack engineered by the JeM, presented a unique but justifiable cause in shaping India’s kinetic response which was delivered 12 days later, on a half-moon night. The IAF’s pre- emptive precision strikes on JeM training camp at Balakot in Khyber-Pakhtunwa marked a perceptible strategic shift in addressing some, if not all, terrorist-related issues emanating from across the borders, nurtured and supported by the Pak deep state. It is not the case that similar response and policy options were not available earlier; but perhaps they were not employed based on certain existential capabilities, constraints of the regional and international environment, challenges of escalatory dynamics and so on. As a consequence, during the intervening years we not only tip-toed around the elephant in the room but in the process emboldened the Pak military-jihadi establishment in truly believing that the LoC/IB was psychologically impregnable in minds of the Indian security establishment. This, despite our self-imposed moratorium of not crossing the LoC during Kargil and strictly enforced by the IAF through the Rules of Engagement (ROE).
Compelling evidence notwithstanding, the Pak establishment continued to adopt the ‘revolving door concept’ with safe sanctuaries not only in PoK but in the hinterland as well. Balakot was one such jihadi training hub infested with hundreds of such radical elements when the IAF struck on 26 February. While Pakistan, as expected, continues to be in a state of denial-- and understandably so--the shock effect combined with the strategic surprise has had a salutary effect on few agencies both within and abroad-- still searching for palpable evidence.
The fine print though will indicate that the Mirage 2000 core strike force comprised only six aircraft with a number of other aircraft embedded as support elements including AEW, AWACS and Flight Refueling aircraft. The entire operation was tactically choreographed in time and space in the hours of darkness to deliver strategic outcomes on what constituted as the ‘jihadi centres of gravity’ residing in Pak. And this was made possible only through effects based targeting for creating strategic effects with precision weapons delivered from substantial stand-off ranges.
While the Government has clarified on more than one occasion that these were non- military targets and the elements at Balakot were indeed being trained for terrorist activities, it is fair to assume that these could be broadly classified as ‘jihadi leadership targeting system’. The targeteers therefore had planned to select a weapon system whose accuracy would enable a strike within a few feet of the target(s) which would then create the first and second - order effects to eliminate a broad cross section of these elements, instead of merely destroying the buildings resulting in collateral damage. It has been widely reported that the Israeli Spice 2000 (980kg) was selected as the weapon of choice (contracted by the IAF in April 2012 as part of a broader plan to widen the template for response options). While the post- strike debates on casualty details etc., appear raucous and somewhat unnecessary, it is clear however, that there were five direct weapon hits on the three building structures. It is assessed that the possibility of anyone walking out of those buildings unharmed appears highly remote.
It may be recalled that for the past several years IAF leadership has been alluding to the aspect of full spectrum capability for credible deterrence alongside doctrinal and technological developments. That some of these were tested at night for the first time in a hostile environment deserves credit for it’s audacious planning and flawless execution. More importantly, it is for the first time that the Indian security establishment successfully leveraged the fusion of electronic and imagery intelligence data with high quality precision weapons for the purpose of formulating a counter terrorism strategy—albeit with limited objectives.
But make no mistake : a one-off Balakot strike now or in the near future may not totally deter or compel a behavioural change nor will it eradicate this type of malignant behavior in our neighbourhood. It would be extremely naïve to even consider such a possibility as Pak institutions, structures and their inter se relationships are hard wired quite differently. Nor can the IAFs demonstrated aerospace capabilities function in isolation without the necessary underpinning of the political, diplomatic and economic counter strategies. And yet, these recent exertions have broadened the strategic landscape and will no doubt, inspire some new strategic approaches while dealing with a recalcitrant adversary. At the most, the security establishment along with key interlocutors can expect a number of such well-calibrated hard and soft response options. These formulations must necessarily be a part of a consistent and an over arching policy in the hope that it may discourage Pakistan from overt state sponsorship of terrorist groups and assist in making regional aggression unattractive in the long term.
There is also no denying that the challenge of escalatory dynamics will continue to remain a highly complex and a ‘live’ issue for the security establishment, more so when the use of offensive airpower is being contemplated in the context of an adversary who exhibits rational behavior at one level and totally emotive and irrational at another-- with the inherent risks involved in squaring off under a nuclear overhang. As an aside, an aspect worth noting is that the mere employment of offensive airpower is not escalatory; it becomes escalatory when it is employed indiscriminately leading to a situation when things can spin quickly out of control. To the credit of the security establishment, it appears the escalation was reasonably well controlled by limiting the operational objectives and by studiously avoiding military, civil or economic targeting clusters. In this case, the larger cause of taking out the terrorist training centres post-Pulwama far outweighed the risk factors entailed in the operation.
As events unfolded on 26-27 February, it appears the PAF’s air defence elements were far too slow to react and were thus in no position to interfere with IAF’s Balakot strike mission (PAF faced a similar situation on 02 May 2011 when Osama bin Laden was virtually plucked out by US Navy Seals from deep inside Abbotabad and the Force had then been severely criticised for nodding off on the wheel!). Ironically, both events share a common terrorist heritage tag. Taken together, PAF’s riposte the next morning was very much anticipated and is considered significant from two aspects. First, their stand-off precision strikes had clearly targeted Northern Command military, installations in the Rajauri and Naushera sectors and secondly, as a result of IAF’s robust air defence response, the strikes failed to hit any of their intended targets clearly demonstrating lack of will and capability. The above narrative however needs to be viewed from the larger aspect of escalation dynamics. For instance, if PAF strikes had indeed been successful in terms of large extent of damage including military/civilian casualties, what then should have been our response? In the fog of war, it is quite easy to take the first shot off the bow; the real test comes in the fourth or fifth reload when response options would have to be quickly evaluated and actions taken based on assessments and deliberations factored into the equation, not during but well prior to the event.
Lastly, Rules of Engagement (ROEs) provide the directives for engaging the adversary in a hostile situation and are clearly aimed at preventing untoward escalation. We can safely assume that unlike the Kargil conflict in which the PAF stayed away while the IAF strictly adhered to the ROE of not violating the LoC, a similar template for Balakot or any other future operation may not hold true. It follows therefore that the ROEs would need to be carefully structured and altered if need be as the situation evolves. The planners would have to project a clear understanding of not only the implications but also capabilities of own forces, lest they be disadvantaged in certain dynamic situations. At the tactical level for example, technological developments have now made it possible for a quantum jump in detection ranges of fighter aircraft airborne radars where these are integrated with highly effective Beyond Visual Range (BVR) missiles. This would permit an interceptor to acquire, lock-on and launch a BVR missile at extraordinary ranges with continuous tracking of the target aircraft till the missile achieves a hit. Incidentally, this capability is now available to both sides.
So if India has to be defended from the third dimension, the offensive air defence operations of own fighters would have to be exploited to the hilt by successfully engaging the adversary in head-on BVR engagements, a move that could entail minor LoC incursions, if necessary. Failure to do so will hobble our air defence operations in an uneven fight akin to entering the combat zone from a position of disadvantage. Once again, the implications would have to be factored into our ROE calculus accordingly, while ensuring that these are consistent with the overall game plan.
Almost a month has now lapsed since that fateful night of 26 February and while the dust over Balakot has not yet fully settled, there is no doubt that India’s best interests would be served through prevention of an armed conflict. Nevertheless, it is reassuring that the recent IAFs air operations, though limited, has only reinforced deterrence and provided a new strategic window. This opportunity must not be wasted.
Air Chief Marshal NAK Browne was Chief of the Air Staff, IAF during 31 July 2011 to 31 December 2013, later serving as India’s Ambassador to Norway.