In the area of design & development, HAL has to its credit many indigenous programmes ranging from gliders, basic piston engine trainers (HT-2, HPT-32), jet trainers (HJT-16 Kiran Mk I and Mk II), supersonic fighter (HF-24 Marut), agricultural aircraft (Basant) and also has carried out to it’s credit a number of aircraft upgrade programmes. Aircraft Types manufactured over the decades began with the Vampire, Gnat, Jaguar, MiG-21 variants and the MiG-27, and all these have served long, in peace and war with the Indian Air Force.
As a nation we have to be proud of these accomplishments. Unfortunately, in the recent past, HAL has been unduly blamed and - it seems - systematically tarnished on the basis of myths, wrong notions and false charges.
Design, production and technological capabilities of HAL should have been factored before the PSU was “knocked out”, being tarnished in the process as being an industry not capable of producing the Rafale. The government is instead buying 36 Rafales in flyaway condition from its original French manufacturers Dassault Aviation. The fact that two thirds of the aircraft in IAF are from HAL’s factories is surely enough testimony to HAL’s manufacturing capability.
All these years, HAL was the major partner in the IAF’s induction of new aircraft and weapon platforms. The government seems to have ignored HAL's track record and its contributions to the nation’s defence in keeping what is its own Company in participating in the national programme to acquire French-origin Rafale fighters for the Indian Air Force.
Rafale sans HAL
HAL being knocked out of the the IAF's Rafale acquisition programme at the last minute and for reasons best known to the powers-that-be is astonishing. Rafales being built abroad and supported in India without HAL’s involvement and support is akin to a chariot without a horse. Any start-up company certainly cannot replicate HAL’s capability which has been built over decades.
Political battles apart, this decision is a matter of serious concern in the larger interests of the nation. In an article that appeared in The Indian Express : "Don’t ground the Rafale" written by former CAS Air Chief Marshal S Krishnaswamy, here were given various reasons : the first one was refusal of Dassault Aviation to take responsibility for the output of HAL and, secondly, insistence of the IAF for the manufacturer to provide guarantees because of what was said to be the unsatisfactory performance of HAL in the past. Finally that the estimated man-hours required to produce aircraft at HAL would be three times the man hours taken at Dassault Aviation.
While the first insinuation one is a myth, the second one is based on incorrect notions, and the third a matter of industrial reality. The actual situation is contrary to what has been perpetuated as one will seen from the following facts.
While the negotiated price per aircraft is closely guarded under the “secrecy clause” of the contract, “poor performance” has unfairly been alluded to HAL, which is unfortunate and has become a subject of open debate which has harmed its global image, seriously damaged the Indian aviation industry in entirety. The image and credibility of India’s public sector undertaking, including its “jewel in the crown” HAL, has become suspect in the global aviation sphere. This is a matter of serious concern and warrants immediate corrective measures.
Now let us also consider impact of the outright purchase of Rafales without any local manufacturing or product support. The programme will entail enormous life cycle costs which will surely drain the defence exchequer. Apart from the national imperative of keeping HAL's extensive facilities engaged as also the strategic aim for achieving self-reliance, being promoted in the ‘Make in India' drive, HAL as major partner of the Rafale programme would have benefitted from transfer of technology, apart from providing spares support over the Rafale’s life cycle of 35-40 years.
Track Record
Since its foundation in December 1940, HAL has grown from strength to strength and is now a world-recognised entity with 11 research and development centres, 20 production units and a work force of 29,300, HAL being ranked as 34th amongst the top 100 global aerospace industries. HAL has produced or overhauled over 3500 aircraft both indigenous under licence, and some 5,015 aero engines. The turnover of the company during 2017-2018 was Rs.18,284 crore. In the last five years HAL's contribution to the exchequer has been Rs.30,429 crores (dividend including taxes paid to the Central and state governments) and the PSU has made a (cumulative) profit of Rs.16,884 crores.
The real causes
But back to the present situation. It has been repeated again and again that the IAF insisted on a “guarantee” from HAL because of what it said, was “unsatisfactory performance” in the past. This is a myth being perpetured by an unfortunate mindset that ‘videshi is achha and swadeshi is kachha’. Unless that mindset is uprooted, self-reliance in defence aviation will forever remain a dream.
In 1993, the government had constituted a committee on fighter aircraft accidents (COFAA) headed by Dr APJ Abdul Kalam, then Secretary, Defence R&D. The committee was to recommend remedial measures to contain such aircraft accidents. Data of the Technical Defect (TD) accidents presented in the report clearly brought out that the rate of TD accidents (number of accidents per 10,000 hours of flying) on fighters, trainers, helicopters and transport aircraft of HAL origin was half that rate of accidents involving aircraft of non-HAL origin, being of comparable technology and vintage, as tabulated below :
Accident rate by aircraft type :
HAL MiG-27 : 0.50
RAC MiG-23 : 0.95
HAL Jaguar : 0.30
RAC MiG-29 : 0.62
HAL Kiran : 0.17
PZL Iskara : 0.42
HAL Cheetah :Chetak : 0.05
MIL Mi-8 : 0.18
Firmly established was that accident rate of HAL-made aircraft were far lower than those imported. I rest my case !
Unraveling more myths
Apart from such statistical data culled from the COFAA report, the following is recalled from the writer's experience and so bust the unfair blame on HAL.
Ground flame-out of R-11 engines : Over a span of just one month there were 12 incidents of ground flame outs. HAL was blamed for poor quality in the process of engine overhaul. It was established that maintenance lapses resulting in fuel contamination.
Inability of Type 77 aircraft to recover from nosedive position : There were two such accidents in quick succession where pilots were unable to move the stabiliser servo booster from the nosedive position – and they ejected safely. Quality of the overhaul at Nasik Division was subjected to vigorous scrutiny. However, it was established that these accidents were because of maintenance lapses at the air force station when there were omissions in routine checks on inlet filter.
Failure of 4th stage compressor disc of R-29 engine of MiG-27 : Bursting of 4th stage compressor disc on ground was yet another case where shadows were cast on the quality of discs manufactured at HAL. Russian experts while giving ‘clean chit’ to the quality of discs manufactured at HAL, established that the failure was because of skipping of an operational drill during taxing. The problem was eliminated after following the prescribed SOP.
Fatal accident of its Avro aircraft: There was a fatal accident of aircraft where the entire crew and IAF band of 28 were killed. There were indications of ‘Fire Warning’ and ‘Auto Feathering of propeller’ prior to the accident and the IAF laid blame of the quality of engine overhaul. HAL was not in agreement as post-accident investigations were contrary to this theory. HAL then independently referred the case to BAE Systems for their independent opinion with a brief narrative of the sequence of accident and conclusions of the court of inquiry. The conclusion was that tragic accident had not happened the manner narrated by the COI but was due to maintenance and operational lapses.
Jaguar accident/incident due to failure of hydraulic system: There were two identical failures of the Jaguar hydraulic system in quick succession when pilots could not lower the undercarriage and the pilots had to abandon aircraft. The IAF pronounced that it was because of quality lapses during aircraft overhaul. BAE System after investigating the second incident pronounced that it was the IAF’s operational and maintenance lapses which resulted in these failures. Independent Investigations continued by HAL established that the component failure was due to ‘Low cycle-High load’ fatigue. After initial reservation, BAE System eventually accepted that the cause was because of design deficiencies in the brake body of the combat slat motor. Eventually the OEM was held responsible and this was accepted.
Summing up, in all the five cases cited above, maintenance, operational lapses and poor quality of the components supplied by OEM were cause for the unfortunate situation and not HAL’s quality as has been made out by the IAF. There are many more such examples.
Incorrect calculation on man hours