Map from the http://www.asia-atlas.com/afghanistan-physical.htm
The 21st Century has been described as the ‘Asian Century’ and for good or bad and for right or wrong reasons, the Century in which we live appears to be centred on this vast continent both temporally and spatially. Not only is Asia home to myriad conflicts, but this part of the world has registered staggering economic and strategic success stories as well. Considering the significance that Asia has come to assume, the largest countries of the Continent, India and China, which their respective economic, political and strategic successes and failures, have drawn global attention. As individual countries, their increasing currency in the international order is evident and resultantly, the rivalry between these two burgeoning economies continues to generate much global interest. Their relations too have been of concern not only to the countries in their neighbourhood but also in distant lands which they seek to influence (see news item on the Sychelles, ed.). One such country where both India and China are investing their resources and reputation is Afghanistan. However, unlike other countries and matters on which they compete and diverge, this landlocked country is being imagined as a possible theatre of cooperation between these two rising powers. To understand why India and China look willing to cooperate both in and on Afghanistan, it is critical to understand their respective reasons for involvement in this country in the first place.
Chinese Checkers in Afghanistan
China’s assistance to Afghanistan, especially when compared to India, has actually been quite paltry. Its interest in international and multilateral activities concerning Afghanistan too has been minimal for the first decade following the USA-led intervention there. Visits and exchanges along with minor economic agreements were amongst the few activities that took place between them at the bilateral level. However, things started to take a different turn early 2011, these winds of change, perhaps ushered by China’s own domestic insecurity as well as because of USA’s decision to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan. What, during the decade 2001-2011 was marked by seeming disinterest and passive participation, was transformed into a policy of active engagement both in and on Afghanistan. The stress on these two prepositions – in and on – stems from the different ways in which China has approached this country, wherein the former took the shape of bilateral economic investments, political exchanges, strategic cooperation the latter was about engaging in multilateral forums concerning Afghanistan.
China’s domestic requirements, in particular, have had major impact on the recalibration of its approach towards Afghanistan. It has been observed that China’s foreign policy is like an external extension of its domestic concerns : “China does not have a foreign policy. We only have a domestic policy, even in our relations with other countries”. This outward expansion of domestic oriented goals has meant that Afghanistan became an area of concern for China only when instability in this country began to impinge on its internal security. Militant attacks in its frontier region of Xinjiang and in other major Chinese centres were seen as a result of rising extremism, which directly and indirectly, was related to the seething instability in Afghanistan. China’s interest in Afghanistan’s stability, therefore, had less to do with its external ambitions and image abroad, rather they being wary of the spill-over effects that instability in Afghanistan had on its own domestic environment. It was only later – following the drawdown of international troops in 2014 – that its involvement in Afghanistan took a more pro-active shape, moving from being a ‘home-abroad’ concern towards a matter that was now of relevance to China’s projection of its intent and capabilities as a responsible power.
That being said, China still sees the USA as the “leading power” on Afghanistan, and it has been observed that the Chinese assessment of the situation in Afghanistan coincides with that of the western nations, in particular the United States. Of late, China’s interest in getting involved with major activities has been apparent, not only has it becoming a willing partner in multilateral negotiations on Afghanistan, but is also taking suo-moto cognisance of the need to promote reconciliation in this ravaged country. Significantly, China has become an active member of (relatively) new multilateral initiatives such as the Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG), the Moscow Peace Process and the like. On its own, China has not only extended its ‘good offices’ or mediatory role between Afghanistan and Pakistan, but has also put in place new regional mechanisms like the Quadrilateral Cooperation and Coordination Mechanism (QCCM) to create multilateral consensus on Afghanistan. Besides these, China’s institutional creation, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), has meditated much on the ‘Afghan Question’. In fact, Shanghai Five with which it had begun, was “focused on mutual intraregional efforts to curb terrorism, separatism and extremism in Central Asia”, whose focal concern was the instability in Afghanistan. Given the membership, mandate and the institutional mandate of the SCO, the ‘Shanghai Spirit’ can provide a more amicable platform for the major stakeholders in the Afghan conflict to seriously work on this problem.
India’s Status Quest in Afghanistan
Much has been written about the role of India in Afghanistan during the recent decades. As South Asia’s largest and globally the fifth biggest donor to Afghanistan, India’s considerable economic contributions to this country have been recognised and appreciated for the tangible effects they have produced. The coming of this acknowledgement, however, was not without wrinkles. Faced with global reluctance and regional insecurities, India’s assistance to Afghanistan was affected by indirect challenges as also direct threats and reactions. Notwithstanding the losses in men and material, India has remained a major source of economic, humanitarian and social assistance to Afghanistan. Still, why did India persist in Afghanistan despite being given the short end of the stick for the greatest part? The answer lies in India’s imagination of its status as a rising power.
As noted by observers, Afghanistan has been a “test-case” for India; a test-case, which in my opinion, has been both because of and for status. Status, which is essentially a social ranking of sorts, has motivated India to innovate, conform to and deviate from the global norms of participation in the post-conflict reconstruction of any country.
A rising power with considerable economic clout, credible democratic success and decent track-record at managing cultural diversity, India has advanced a solid case for its active and deep involvement in Afghanistan. At one level, its material assistance to Afghanistan remains unparalleled in South Asia, also when compared with China. At another, India has instructive political, economic and social experience that is of use to Afghanistan as it is more locally attuned than the western models of state-building. After the 9/11 attacks in the USA, India’s clear stand on terrorism and demand for action against terrorism, felt that it must be considered as one of the (ideological) bulwarks against extremism. It was felt, that this could move forward when it was given due space to voice its concerns and be majorly involved in the redevelopment of Afghanistan.
Viewing Afghanistan as being very much in its ‘strategic neighbourhood’, India’s involvement in this country was an opportunity to demonstrate its status as a responsible, rising power. By building ideational alliances even in the face of international (and regional) resistance, India demonstrated its intent and capabilities to stay the course in Afghanistan for the material and social advantages that accrued of it. India’s popularity amongst the peoples of Afghanistan as well as goodwill within the administrative and political circles there are indicators of such appeal. The fact that a hitherto reluctant USA, which not so long ago was towing the Pakistani narrative, now sees India as a major partner in its South Asian strategy, an explicit approval of the work India has done in Afghanistan.
What’s with the China-India bonhomie?
It is well accepted that as rising Asian powers, India and China are rivals and competitors, not only with each other for gaining material ascendancy, but looking for ways to establish their normative superiority as well. As two of the fastest growing economies in the world with combined population of almost 3 billion, the nuclear-weapon equipped States have found themselves in fierce competition with each other to command what look like coinciding spheres of influence.
While not at par with each other, a fact that both these countries recognise in their own ways and to different effects, this realisation has, however, not marred their competitive orientation towards each other. However, the Pakistan angle has further complicated what could have been a neat, one-on-one rivalry. But since no rivalry has ever existed without a third leg of the stool, the insertion of Pakistan in their bilateral ties has created obvious friction, dissonance and suspicion. Nevertheless, China and India share an economic relationship that makes it hard for them ignore each other. Apart from that one major war in 1962, potential conflict between India and China has remained largely contained, confined to some frontiers and in multilateral-institutional theatres. Furthermore, apprehensive about the actions of increasingly disinterested and wavering American global dispensation under President Donald Trump, both India and China recognise the need to manage their rivalries in a manner that can secure and advance the progress they have made over the past seven decades.
Managing their rivalries, as a new approach towards status competition and management suggests, Afghanistan could very well become the arena where India and China could well converge not only for the sake of this unfortunate country but for demonstrating their respective ambitions but collective intent as well. What has begun with the Wuhan Summit, which was an act of informal diplomacy between the chief executives of these two countries, India and China have since then reiterated their commitment to pool their efforts both in and on Afghanistan.
While the specifics possible cooperation are still speculative, the fact that these two countries have repeatedly asserted their desire to combine their efforts in Afghanistan reflects their intent to make good of their intensions. Perhaps what makes these two competitive rising powers want to converge in Afghanistan is, among other reasons, faltering and fatigued US efforts in Afghanistan which are a source of concern for both India and China. Even if the Asian giants are on different tracks, but these are not in conflict with each other. Thus, even if India’s imagination of its role in Afghanistan and what it can get out of it are dissimilar to those of China and while they are on different pages vis-à-vis one another, they do not appear to be on any collision path. Certainly, both India and China see stability in Afghanistan to be of vital interest to their respective national and trans-national concerns and thus, are willing to work towards that achievement. Their collective efforts in this dimension can be seen not only to meet strategic requirements, but could well let off some steam from their otherwise competitive relationship.
Chayanika Saxena
President Graduate Scholar and PhD candidate at the Department of Geography, National University of Singapore (Singapore).